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ABSTRACT 
TWO ESSAYS ON BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
Quang Viet Vu 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. Kenneth Yung 
The first essay is entitled: "CEO Overconfidence, Corporate Governance 
Practices and Firm Innovation". In this study, I examine if overconfident CEOs 
overinvest or underinvest in innovative projects. I also investigate if overconfident 
CEOs pursue innovative projects to benefit personal interests or the interest of 
shareholders. By focusing on the effect of corporate governance in monitoring the 
behavior of overconfident CEOs, my results show that there is a negative relation 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation among firms with poor 
governance. In these cases, the finding is consistent with the implication that 
overconfident CEO are entrenched and invest inadequately in innovative projects 
when the firm has poor corporate governance. My results also show that for well-
governanced firms, the overconfident CEOs do not overinvest because good risky 
projects are accepted and results in an increase in firm value. The other important 
result of my study is that well-governanced firms could influence the behavior of 
overconfident CEOs so that firm performance (measured by Tobin's q, ROA, and 
sales growth) is enhanced. On the other hand, it is also found that overconfident 
CEOs of poorly-governanced firms might pursue innovative projects so aggressively 
that projects with low expected payoff are accepted and results in poorer firm 
performance. These results add to the literature on managerial overconfidence by 
showing that the behavior of overconfident CEOs can be influenced and corporate 
governance could guide overconfident managers to invest selectively in good risky 
projects. In addition, my results offer insights into the puzzle why irrational managers 
are hired by showing that overconfident managers are hired because they could 
enhance firm performance if they were monitored by good governance practices. 
The second essay is entitled "Book-Tax Income Differences: a New Measure 
of Earnings Management'. In this study I develop a comprehensive measure that 
captures taxable income related earnings management in addition to the 
conventional book income related accruals management. To confirm the adequacy 
of the new measure of earnings management developed in this study, I revisit 
several earnings management related issues previously investigated in the literature 
to see if the new measure performs better than conventional measures. The issues I 
re-examine include: 
1. Executive stock option exercises - Insiders have incentives to use private 
information about forthcoming earnings to time their stock option exercises. 
Conflicting results have been documented by Bartov (2004), Efendi (2007) 
and Armstrong et al. (2009). My new measure that captures both income tax 
related and book income related earnings management may provide better 
insights. My results also show that executives time their stock option 
exercises regardless of the source of earnings management. 
2. Firm credit ratings - Earnings management has led to downward revisions of 
firm credit ratings because credit analysts are able to see through the 
information content of earnings management (Ayers et al. 2009). The book-
tax earnings management measure I develop can provide additional 
information to credit analysts. My results show that credit analysts react 
favorably to tax savings associated with tax planning activity when other 
information is obscured by earnings management. 
3. Firm Value and earnings management - Outside investors are in general 
unable to fully comprehend the information underlying earnings management. 
The new book-tax earnings management measure I develop may help 
investors respond more correctly as the measure incorporates more 
information. My results show that once investors decipher the information of 
earnings management, they correct their errors in the following time periods. 
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ESSAY 1 
CEO OVERCONFIDENCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES AND FIRM INNOVATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
As today's business environments become more complex and challenging, 
the manager is confronted with the demanding task of making tough decisions 
regularly. To make effective decisions in such an environment, the manager must 
have significant skills and important attributes, including a high-level of self-
confidence. According to Jack Welch, the former CEO of General Electric, self-
confidence and courage are required for a manager to "pick the bets, put the 
resources behind them, articulate the vision to the employees, and explain why he 
said yes to this one and no to that one." That is, decision making may involve more 
than logic and sophisticated analyses. 
Self-confidence is a complicated concept that has often been compared to 
related ideas such as self-efficacy, self-esteem, self-satisfaction, self-worth, self-
respect, or self-acceptance (Tharenou 1979). In the business environment, a self-
confident manager is one who is willing to make what are often very complicated and 
tough decisions. The willingness of the manager in decision making depends on his 
belief in his capabilities and effectiveness as a decision maker. However, the 
manager, like most people, exhibits varying levels of self-confidence. Some 
managers are more likely to produce decisions that are relatively free of risk 
because of their lack of self-confidence; other managers may prefer decisions that 
have risky outcomes due to their high levels of self-confidence. In psychology 
literature, people with high levels of self-confidence are also deemed overconfident. 
It is found that overconfident persons typically overestimate their abilities and 
overestimate the accuracy of their knowledge (Taylor and Brown 1988; Braumeister 
1998). Psychologists have provided significant evidence that people tend to be 
overconfident (Kidd 1970; Moore 1977). For example, drivers overestimate their 
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driving skills, students their scores in examinations, and gamblers their odds in card 
games. Overconfidence also has significant impacts on managerial behavior. 
Weinstein (1980) find that overconfident CEOs underestimate the probability of 
failure and are overoptimistic about the future. However, overconfidence is not 
necessarily bad for the firm. Bandura (1986) argues that overconfidence promotes 
self-efficacy and accentuates the willingness to face challenges. It has also been 
observed that overconfidence is associated with the willingness to explore and the 
readiness to assume risk (Bernardo and Welch 2001; Goel and Thakor 2008). 
In recent years, the relation between overconfident CEOs and firm behavior 
has received much attention from researchers. There is evidence that managerial 
overconfidence is associated with corporate investment distortions (Malmendier and 
Tate 2005), value-destroying mergers (Malmendier and Tate 2008), debt 
conservatism (Malmendier et al. 2007), or excess entry in a market (Camerer and 
Lovallo 1999). A recent strand of research has examined the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on firm innovation. Galasso and Simcoe (2010) and Hirshleifer, Low 
and Teoh (2010) reach the same conclusion that firms with overconfident CEOs 
invest more in innovation. Despite Hirshleifer et al. (2010) find that overconfidence is 
not associated with a decline in firm value; they find mixed evidence regarding the 
effect of overconfident CEOs in improving firm value. 
In this study, I extend the works of Galasso and Simcoe (2010) and 
Hirshleifer et al. (2010). Several concerns motivate my investigation. First, existing 
studies have documented a positive relation between CEO overconfidence and firm 
innovation, but it is unclear whether overconfident CEOs overinvest in innovative 
projects. Second, based on the mixed result of Hirschleifer et al. (2010) on the 
relation between firm performance and firm innovation, the literature has yet to 
determine if overconfident CEOs innovate to benefit self-interests or the interest of 
shareholders. Third, is it possible to influence the behavior of overconfident CEOs so 
that they accept good but risky projects mainly? Based on these three just-
mentioned concerns, I conduct the current study to achieve the following objectives. 
My first objective is to determine whether overconfident CEOs overinvest or 
underinvest in innovative projects. Overconfidence is not an agency problem (Rolls 
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1986). Thus, excessive investments by overconfident CEOs in innovative projects 
should not be viewed as overinvestments from an agency perspective. The first 
objective of my study is, however, directly related to two statements made by 
Hirshleifer et al. (2010). First, the authors mention that overconfident managers who 
pursue innovative projects aggressively may undertake projects with low expected 
payoff. Then they further mention that overconfident mangers can potentially achieve 
higher average innovative productivity by accepting good but risky projects. Based 
on these statements, I examine the influence of corporate governance on the 
relation between CEO overconfidence and innovation. Kolasinksi and Li (2012) find 
that CEO overconfidence could be attenuated by the presence of a strong corporate 
board. Thus, I argue that firms with good governance practices can monitor 
overconfident CEOs to the extent that they invest primarily in good but risky projects. 
The positive relation between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation for well-
governanced firms, however, does not imply excessive investments because good 
innovative projects are beneficial to shareholders. On the other hand, I also argue 
that for poorly-governanced firms, the relation between CEO overconfidence and 
firm innovation could be either positive or negative. The reason is that CEOs are less 
effectively monitored when corporate governance practices are poor, thus the 
overconfident CEO may pursue innovative projects so aggressively that projects with 
low expected payoff are accepted. In such cases, a positive relation between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation is consistent with the implication that the firm has 
invested excessively (overinvest) in innovative projects. If the relation between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation is negative for poorly-governanced firms, then it 
is consistent with implications that entrenchment effects dominate the influence of 
CEO overconfidence and less than optimal innovative projects are pursued. In short, 
poorly-governanced firms may either overinvest (invest too much) or underinvest 
(invest inadequately) in innovation. 
My second objective in this study is to determine whether overconfident 
CEOs invest in innovative projects to enhance personal interests or firm value. 
Based on the finding of Kolasinksi and Li (2012) and the ample evidence in the 
literature that firms with good corporate governance are less likely to invest in value-
decreasing projects, I argue that for firms with good corporate governance practices 
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the investment in innovative projects by overconfident CEOs is for promoting the 
wealth of shareholders. On the other hand, for firms with poor governance practices, 
overconfident CEOs may pursue innovative projects so aggressively that even firm-
value decreasing investments are accepted. In such cases, the observation is 
consistent with implications that the overconfident CEO is more interested in 
achieving personal satisfaction than protecting the interest of shareholders. 
My results show a positive relation between CEO overconfidence and firm 
innovation for firms that have good governance practices. For these well-
governanced firms, the overconfident CEOs do not overinvest because it is likely 
that good innovative projects, despite risky, are accepted. My results also show that 
there is a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation among 
firms with poor governance. In these cases, the finding is consistent with the 
implication that entrenchment effects dominate the effect of CEO overconfidence 
and the firm invests inadequately in innovative projects. The other important result of 
my study is that well-governanced firms could influence the behavior of 
overconfident CEOs to the extent that firm performance is enhanced. On the other 
hand, it is also found that overconfident CEOs of poorly-governanced firms might 
pursue innovative projects so aggressively that projects with low expected payoff are 
accepted and results in poorer firm performance. 
My work contributes to three lines of research. First, my results add to the 
literature on managerial overconfidence by showing that the behavior of 
overconfident CEOs can be influenced. My finding is consistent with the result of 
Kolasinksi and Li (2012) that good corporate governance practices can attenuate the 
errors of overconfident CEOs. Second, I expand the literature on corporate 
innovation by showing how corporate governance plays a significant role in 
monitoring investment activity in innovative projects by overconfident CEOs. My 
result shows that corporate governance could guide (encourage) overconfident 
managers to invest selectively in good risky (i.e. value-enhancing) projects. My 
finding supports the conclusion of John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) that good corporate 
governance promotes value-increasing risk-taking behavior. In addition, my results 
offer insights into the puzzle why irrational managers are hired. Hirshleifer et al 
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(2010) argue that overconfident CEOs are hired because they are better innovators. 
Galasso and Simcoe (2010) suggest that overconfident CEOs are hired because 
they may be more capable in guiding the firm to make strategic changes. I add to the 
arguments by showing that overconfident managers are hired because they could 
enhance firm performance if they were monitored by good governance practices. 
1.2 LITERATURE 
This study is built on several lines of research that include the examination of 
the psychology of overconfidence, investigations on irrational managerial behavior, 
studies of corporate risk-taking behavior, and inquires of the impact of corporate 
governance on firm behavior. 
1.2.1 Literature on the psychology of overconfidence 
Psychologists have extensively investigated the phenomenon of 
overconfidence and reached the consensus that most people are overconfident. 
That is, people tend to overestimate their abilities and underestimate the probability 
of failure (Miller and Rose 1975). For example, Svenson (1981) reports that about 
80% of drivers believe they have better driving skills than the average driver. Langer 
(1975) finds that overconfident persons believe they have more control of the 
outcome if they personally throw a dice than if someone else does it. Weinstein 
(1980) shows that most CEOs believe the investment projects chosen by them 
personally have a lower chance of failure. A number of studies indicate that 
overconfidence is associated with significant advantages in decision making. For 
example, Bandura (1986) finds that people tend to avoid tasks and situations. Their 
belief exceed their capabilities, but they undertake and perform assuredly activities 
they judge themselves capable of performing. Taylor and Brown (1994) are among 
the proponents of the hypothesis that overconfidence is both normal and adaptive. 
They argue that overconfidence can serve a wide range of cognitive, affective, and 
social functions. In a recent study, Ludwig, Wichardt, and Wickhorst (2011) show in 
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a theoretical model that overconfidence can improve a person's relative and 
absolute performance in contests compared to an unbiased person. 
The more recent psychology literature argues that there are several distinct 
forms of overconfidence. Moore and Healy (2008) distinguish between 
overestimation (of own ability and performance), overplacement (that is, the belief to 
be better than others), and overprecision (that is, excessive certainty about the 
accuracy of one's belief). Hilton, Regner, Cabantous, Charalambides, and Vautier 
(2011) differentiate between judgmental overconfidence (overestimating the 
precision of one's judgments), self-enhancement biases (positive self-illusions such 
as better-than-average effect and the illusion of control), and optimism with respect 
to societal task. Among all these different dimensions, judgmental overconfidence 
and self-enhancement biases are important to financial economists because 
corporate decisions involve frequent dealings with uncertainty and risk and such 
situations are more likely affected by CEOs exhibiting traits of overconfidence. 
1.2.2 Literature on irrational managerial behavior 
For decades, rationality is the foundation of mainstream models and theories 
of firm behavior. Financial economists have typically assumed that mangers 
behavior rationally with the objective of maximizing the wealth of shareholders in 
managing corporate affairs. In recent years, many researchers have started 
producing empirical evidence that irrational managerial biases also affect firm 
behavior significantly. Daniel Kahneman, the 2002 Noble Laureate in economics, is 
a pioneer in decision-making theory whose insights contribute significantly to the 
understanding of irrational human behavior. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
introduce the prospect theory that accounts for a number of systematic biases in 
irrational managerial behavior. The following is a brief introduction of several 
irrational managerial biases that are related to the prospect theory: 
a. Loss Aversion 
It is argued that there is asymmetry between perceived gains and losses. 
Psychologists have demonstrated in a number of experiments that participants are 
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about twice more likely to avoid losses than favor gains. That is, individuals consider 
losses larger than equal-size gains; and individuals on average have an incentive to 
avoid losses. Consistent with this observation, Odean (1998) find evidence that 
investors hold on to their losing stocks too long but sell their winning stocks too 
soon. In the corporate arena, loss aversion implies the incentive to throw good 
money after bad money. Shefrin (2001) and Shimizu and Hitt (2005) observe that 
many firms retained money-losing business units for extended time periods without 
divesting them. Guedj and Scharfstein (2008) study the pharmaceutical industry and 
find that single-product early stage firms are reluctant to abandon their drugs even 
though the clinical results are not promising. 
b. Risk seeking 
Another prediction of the prospect theory is the irrational risk-seeking 
behavior of individuals. It is posited that individuals will take irrational risks when the 
alternative is a certain loss. The underlying argument is that the loss aversion 
sentiment is so strong that individuals strongly prefer risks that might mitigate a loss. 
A likely scenario is when a project has a certain but small loss, the manager prefers 
an alternate project that has a large potential payoff but with a high risk of failure. 
The bias toward potentially larger payoffs distorts managerial decisions. An example 
of risk seeking is reported by Wall Street Journal on March 29, 2007 regarding the 
CEO of Royal Dutch Shell PLC. It was reported by Wall Street Journal that after the 
new CEO joined the firm, he made changes to the board that essentially gave him 
control of the entire company. The new CEO guided the firm to invest in very risky 
adventures in Middle East and remote Russia instead of focusing on traditional less-
risky projects in developed countries. 
c. Reference-Point Preferences 
In the prospect theory, satisfaction is defined not in terms of the level of 
wealth or consumption but in terms of changes relative to a reference level. For 
example, using purchase price as a reference point, stock investors hesitate to sell 
at a loss despite there are compelling reasons doing so. The reference-point bias 
also has impacts on irrational firm behavior related to earnings management, 
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mergers and acquisitions, lending and borrowing arrangements. It is well 
documented in the literature that firms manage earnings to meet or exceed important 
reference points such as positive earnings, past reported earnings, and analysts' 
expectations (Burgsthaler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 
1999). The phenomenon is found to have existed in both developed and developing 
economies (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Defond, Hung, and Trezevant 2006). It 
is also found in the literature that acquiring firms use recent price peaks of target 
firms as reference points in determining the acquisition price of the target (Baker, 
Pan, and Wurgler 2011). The authors document that there is a spike in the 
distribution of offer prices at the target's 52-week high and other historical peaks. It 
is, however, argued by some researchers that the acquisition price of the target in 
mergers and acquisitions is sometimes overvalued (Shleifer and Vishny 2003; 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan 2005; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and 
Teoh 2005). The reference-point bias also exists in lending and borrowing practices 
among firms. That is, borrowers and lenders use past credit terms as reference 
points for current arrangements. Dougal, Engelberg, Parsons, and Van Wesep 
(2011) find that current borrowing costs are significantly related to historical costs. 
The authors report that the borrowing cost on loans taken out during the 2005 and 
2007 time period is hardly affected by the 2008 financial crisis. For the borrowers 
that did not suffer a decline in credit rating, about 1/3 borrowed at the same rate as 
before the crisis. In addition, reference-point biases have been found to exert 
influences on dividend policies, equity issuance decisions, and debt financing 
arrangements. 
d. Escalation of commitment 
Another likely outcome of loss aversion is the tendency not to abandon an 
investment project despite mounting evidence that the action is not rational. Staw 
and Ross (1989) find that managers allocate more resources to an investment 
project when there is evidence that the project is failing than when the project is 
succeeding. Schmidt and Calantone (2002) also report that managers tend to keep 
pumping resources in failing projects that were started by them than admitting 
failure. The literature has numerous examples of 'runaway' investments that persist 
9 
and continue to receive funding despite the action is not justified by simple cost-
benefits analysis (Nulden 1996). Very often, escalation of commitment results in 
misallocations of corporate resources and makes related managerial behavior 
unexplainable from a rationality perspective. 
e. Overconfidence 
Managerial overconfidence has been investigated extensively in extant 
literature. Malmendier and Tate (2003) report evidence of such a behavioral bias that 
overconfident CEOs retain significant amounts of cash for investment activity than 
distributing cash dividends to shareholders. It is argued that overconfident CEOs 
overestimate their ability and frequently end up investing in projects that should have 
been avoided. There is evidence that managerial overconfidence is associated with 
many types of corporate investment distortions (Malmendier and Tate 2005), value-
destroying mergers (Malmendier and Tate 2008), debt conservatism (Malmendier et 
al. 2007), or excess entry in a market (Camerer and Lovallo 1999). A real life 
example is the CEO of Quaker, who after successfully acquired Gatorade and turned 
it into a big success, became overconfident and went on to acquire Snapple. The 
acquisition eventually became a big disaster for the firm. A recent strand of research 
has examined the effect of managerial overconfidence on firm innovation. Galasso 
and Simcoe (2010) and Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2010) reach the same conclusion 
that firms with overconfident CEOs invest more in innovative projects. Despite 
Hirshleifer et al. (2010) find that overconfidence is not associated with a decline in 
firm value; they find mixed evidence regarding the effect of overconfident CEOs in 
improving firm value. 
The literature review presented above indicates the significance of irrational 
managerial behavior in the corporate sector. The mounting evidence of behavioral 
biases has cast significant doubts on the assumption of rationality in conventional 
financial theories. In recent years, the research on behavioral corporate finance has 
drawn the attention of scholars and practitioners. Behavioral approaches 
complement traditional financial theories in offering intuitive and convincing 
explanations for many corporate phenomena that are unexplainable by traditional 
paradigms. 
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1.2.3 Literature on corporate governance 
Corporate governance consists of mechanisms to ensure that agency 
problems between shareholders and managers or between majority and minority 
shareholders are controlled or resolved, with the objective to ensure that suppliers of 
finance to corporations will get a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). The research on corporate governance is voluminous. Corporate governance 
may involve the following mechanisms: 
i. Compensation schemes that align the interests of managers and owners. 
In general, it is argued that stock and option based compensation schemes can 
motivate managers to maximize firm value. 
ii. A board structure that includes independent directors to monitor the 
manager's discretional behavior. When the CEO is also the chairman of the board, 
corporate governance is bad because excessive power is concentrated in the hands 
of the CEO. 
iii. Corporate bylaws that protect shareholder rights. For example, bylaws 
that guarantees mandatory dividend and/or proxy voting by mail. Bylaws that prevent 
the firm from adopting antitakeover provisions enable corporate raiders to protect the 
rights of shareholders by imposing controls on managers who are not interested in 
enhancing firm value. 
iv. An ownership structure that encourages monitoring of managerial 
behavior. For example, the presence of institutional owners or large outside 
shareholders may exert pressure in controlling undesirable actions of the manager. 
Dual-class equity is considered a bad governance practice as the ownership 
structure concentrates excessive voting power in a small number of shareholders. 
1.2.4 Literature on risk-taking behavior of firms and the influence of 
corporate governance 
Many individuals assume risks for psychological satisfaction, but in the 
business sector the willingness to assume risk frequently reflects the desire to 
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pursue profitable opportunities. The relation between risk taking and pecuniary 
motives is quite straight forward when the business owner is also the manager. 
However, the separation of ownership and control in the corporate sector has made 
managerial risk-taking behavior a complicated issue. Manager-owner agency 
problems arise when managers' interests diverge from those of shareholders, 
resulting in lower firm values (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Risk taking is predominantly manifested in corporate investment activity. The 
literature on the relation between agency conflicts and corporate investment is 
voluminous despite the predictions from this literature are not necessarily 
unanimous. Whether under- or overinvestment occurs as agency conflicts become 
more significant is still a debatable topic. Among the various viewpoints supporting 
the underinvestment outcome, some posit that managers underinvest because they 
cannot fully diversify the risk of firm-specific human capital (Amihud and Lev 1981). 
Some researchers argue that underinvestment occurs when investment performance 
affects the reputation of the manager's ability (Hirschleifer and Thakor 1992); others 
argue that underinvestment occurs because managers have a limited payout horizon 
(Smith and watts 1992). On the other hand, many have argued that managers have 
incentives to overinvest because of personal benefits (Jensen 1986, 1993; Stulz 
1990; Hart 1995). There is significant evidence in the literature that some managers 
are empire builders to the extent that negative net present value projects are 
accepted. 
It has been argued that agency conflicts can be reduced when corporate 
governance measures are used to align managerial interests with those of the owner 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990; Downs and Summer 1999). The literature, however, 
provides opposite views on how corporate governance affects managerial risk-taking 
activities. On one hand, some argue that antitakeover provisions protect managers 
from market disciplines and promote their incentives to overinvest (Jensen and 
Ruback 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Gompers et al. (2003) find that firms with 
weak governance are associated with higher levels of capital expenditures. Some 
researchers report find that proper shareholder rights protection make other 
stakeholders such as creditors and labor groups less effective in reducing 
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managerial risk-taking (Morck and Nakamura 1999; Tirole 2001). Acharya et al. 
(2009) report similar evidence by showing that higher shareholder protection induces 
more focus-increasing acquisitions. Opposite to the view that corporate governance 
mechanisms may lead to overinvestment, some posit that antitakeover provisions 
increase managerial slacks and weaken the incentive to invest (Giroud and Mueller 
2010). 
Some studies specifically focus on the effect on corporate governance on the 
manager's willingness to assume long-term risks such as R&D investments. 
DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Stein (1988) argue that antitakeover provisions 
reduce managerial myopia and encourage managers to invest in projects that have 
long-term payoffs without having to worry about job security associated with 
takeovers. Harris (1990) stipulates that golden parachutes allow firm managers to 
invest in long-term specialized projects that may not be marketable to other 
companies. Similarly, Coles et al. (2009) use board co-option as an indicator of CEO 
entrenchment and find evidence that R&D intensity is positively related to board co-
option. The common implication underlying these studies is that entrenched 
managers are more likely to accept long-term risky projects such as R&D 
investments. On the other hand, some argue that managers focus on extraction of 
private benefits when corporate governance is poor, resulting in extreme risk 
aversion (Morck et al. 2005; Stulz 2005). 
The effect of corporate governance on firm performance is less than straight 
forward. An extensive empirical research has documented that firms with strong 
corporate governance mechanisms are in general associated with better firm 
performance, higher stock returns and higher firm valuation (Core et al. 2006; 
Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Bebchuk et al. 2009; Ammann et al. 2011). However, a 
growing number of studies question the positive relation between corporate 
governance and firm performance. For example, Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) 
argue that the results by Gompers et al. (2003) are driven by the impact of 
technology firms on the disparities in the stock prices in the 1990s. Ferreira and 
Laux (2007) find that firms with a better governance measure based on the G-index 
of Gompers et al. are riskier firms and that explains why firms with good corporate 
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governance have higher returns. Some researchers do not find empirical evidence of 
a significant positive relation between corporate governance and stock performance 
(Firth, Rui, and Fung 2002; Pham, Suchard, and Zein 2007). Aman and Nguyen 
(2007) find that firms with poor governance have better market performance than 
firms with good governance in Japan. In sum, the effect of corporate governance 
appears to be stronger on firm value (Tobin's Q) but less strong for operating 
performance and stock returns. It has been argued that the conflicting evidence in 
the literature on the relation between firm performance and corporate governance is 
due to endogeneity problems (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999; Coles, 
Lemmon and Meschke 2003). For example, more capable managers are attracted to 
firms with better governance structures. 
1.3 MOTIVATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
1.3.1 Motivation 1: existing studies have not yet investigated how 
corporate governance affects the relation between overconfident 
CEOs and firm innovation 
Innovations that develop new technologies and seek to provide new products 
or services are important for firms to succeed in competitive markets. Some 
researchers have investigated how firm innovation is affected by CEO 
overconfidence (Galasso and Simcoe 2010; Hirshleifer et al. 2010) while many have 
examined how corporate governance is related to corporate research and 
development investments (Honore and Florence 2010; Munari et al. 2010; Aghion et 
al. 2009). Despite it has been found that overconfident CEOs invest more in 
innovative projects, the impact of corporate governance on the relation has not been 
examined yet. 
Some researchers of the relation between corporate governance and firm 
R&D intensity argue that, according to the agency theory, managers might under-
invest in innovative projects because of risks to human capital and career concerns 
(Fama 1980; Ahimud and Lev 199; Zwiebel 1995). In addition, some argue that 
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managers focus on extraction of private benefits when corporate governance is poor, 
resulting in extreme risk aversion (Morck et al. 2005; Stulz 2005). Studies of cross­
country comparisons have also made similar suggestions that weak corporate 
governance reduces risk-taking incentives of managers (John, Litov, and Yeung 
2008). Lhuillery (2011) also finds that entrenched managers have less incentive to 
invest. In short, many have opined that poor governance has a negative impact on 
high-risk adventures such as R&D investments. 
In contrast to the view just presented, those who propose the growth-
argument suggest that managers have incentives to over-invest in R&D because the 
size of personal benefits is positively correlated with company size (Baker et 
al. 1988). It is argued that managers also have non-monetary incentives to assume 
risk by overinvesting in R&D in order to obtain power and prestige at the cost of 
shareholders. DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Stein (1988) argue that antitakeover 
provisions reduce managerial myopia and encourage managers to invest in projects 
that have long-term payoffs without having to worry about job security associated 
with takeovers. Harris (1990) stipulates that golden parachutes allow firm managers 
to invest in long-term specialized projects that may not be marketable to other 
companies. Similarly, Coles et al. (2009) use board co-option as an indicator of CEO 
entrenchment and find evidence that R&D intensity is positively related to board co-
option. Thus, this line of research suggests that poor corporate governance is likely 
to have a positive effect on R&D investments. 
Despite the above evidence that poor corporate governance might have 
opposite effects on the risk-taking incentive of CEOs, John et al. (2008) find that 
good governance practices lead firms to undertake riskier but value-enhancing 
investments. Honore (2010) examines a sample of French corporations and finds 
evidence that firms with comprehensive shareholder governance practices are 
relatively more R&D intensive. A larger number of earlier studies also find that good 
shareholder rights protection is associated with higher levels of corporate risk-taking 
(e.g., Hirshleifer and Thakor 1992; La Porta et al. 1999; Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
2002). Thus I develop the follow hypothesis linking the effect of corporate 
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governance on the relation between overconfident CEOs and investment in 
innovation projects. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with better corporate governance practices have a 
positive relation between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation. 
1.3.2 Motivation 2: Why do firms hire irrational managers who are 
overconfident? 
The assumption of rational behavior has been the foundation stone of 
behavioral models for decades. In finance literature, it is assumed that managers act 
rationally to protect and maximize the value of the firm. Thus, the presence of 
overconfident managers is a puzzle to researchers. Hirshleifer et al. (2010) provide 
an answer to the puzzle by showing that overconfident CEOs are better innovators. 
Galasso and Simcoe (2010) furnish another answer by suggesting that overconfident 
CEOs might be more capable to lead a change in the firm's direction, particularly in 
competitive industries. I propose here another reason that firms hire overconfident 
CEOs because overconfident CEOs can improve firm performance when monitored 
by good corporate governance. Hirschleifer et al (2010) suggest that overconfident 
managers who pursue innovation aggressively may undertake projects with low 
expected payoff. The authors also suggest that overconfident managers can 
potentially achieve higher average innovative productivity by accepting good but 
risky projects. I extend the argument of Hirshleifer et al. by suggesting that firms with 
good corporate governance can monitor overconfident CEOs to the extent that they 
incline to accept good risky projects only. That is, firms hire overconfident CEOs 
because they can be monitored by governance measures to improve firm 
performance. My argument is consistent with the findings of many researchers that 
firm performance positively related to corporate governance practices (see survey of 
the literature by Bebchuk and Weisbach 2011). In addition, my suggestion is 
supported by the finding of Kolasinki and Li (2010) that the behavior of overconfident 
managers could be monitored. Kolasinki and Li find that small boards dominated by 
independent directors reduce the impact of CEO overconfidence on acquisition 
frequency. Thus, I develop the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 2: Firms with good corporate governance practices have better 
performance measures as overconfident CEOs are monitored to accept good but 
risky innovative projects on average. 
1.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
1.4.1 The Sample 
I use several databases including the Standard and Poor's Execucomp, 
Compustat, and NBER patent files to construct the sample. The sample period ends 
in 2006 because the NBER data files provide patent information up to this year only. 
Besides, publicly available corporate governance indicators such as G-index 
(Gompers et al. 2003) and E-index (Bebchuk et al 2005) also stop in 2006. The 
Execucomp database provides information on executive compensation and some 
personal characteristics. Following Malmendier and Tate (2005a, b) I use the data 
on option compensation to construct an indicator measuring CEO overconfidence. 
All the accounting data are obtained from Compustat. Patent-related data are from 
the 2006 edition of the NBER patent database. The E and G indexes are obtained 
from the websites of professor Bebchuck and professor Metrick, respectively. 
To be included in the sample, a firm is required to have a market value 
greater than 100 million dollars. Financial firms with 2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 69 
and utility companies with 2-digit SICs from 40 to 49 are excluded from the study. It 
is required that each sampled firm must have data in the patent database and 
compensation data are available to calculate the measure of CEO overconfidence. 
Firms with missing data on control variables and dependent variables are deleted. 
The initial sample includes more than 62,000 firm-year observations, but the final 
sample consists of only 1,729 firm-year observations between 1999 and 2006. 
Without including corporate governance measures in their study, Galasso and 
Simcoe (2010) have a sample size of 3648 firm-year observations from 1980 to 
1994, but only 1512 firm-year observations have data for an options-based measure 
(which I also use in this study) of CEO overconfidence. My sample size, after 
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requiring the availability of G-index and E-index, is therefore comparable to that of 
Galasso and Simcore. 
1.4.2 Measuring firm innovation 
Many researchers use patent count and citation count as measures of 
innovation. However, Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1987) show that simple patent 
counts capture innovation success imperfectly because innovations vary widely in 
terms of significance. Sometimes, patents are granted despite the innovation may 
have zero impact on firm value. Trajtenberg (1990) and Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2005) show that citation count is a better indicator of innovation as it shows better 
correlations with measures of firm value. Therefore the measure of firm innovation 
used in this study is total citation count. Following Galasso and Simcoe (2010) and 
Hisrhelifer et al. (2010), citation count is measured as the number of total citations 
summed across all patents applied for during the year and multiplied by a weighting 
index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). Data for patent citations are 
constructed using the 2006 edition of the NBER patent database (Hall et al., 2001). 
The database covers over 3.2 million patent grants and 23.6 million patent citations 
from 1976 to 2006 and contains information about patent assignee names and their 
Compustat-matched identifiers, the number of citations received by each patent, etc. 
Patents are included in the database only if they are eventually granted. Given that 
there is on average a two-year lag between patent application and patent grant, 
patents applied for in 2004 and 2005 may not appear in the 2006 database. In my 
data collection process, I also follow Bessen (2009) in matching patent data to 
Compustat data given that patent ownership sometimes changes. 
1.4.3 Measuring CEO Overconfidence 
Extant literature identifies overconfident CEOs as those who deliberately 
over-expose their personal wealth to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms (Lambert, 
Larcker, and Verrecchia 1991; Meulbroek 2001; Hall and Murphy 2002). Following 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a and 2008), a CEO is considered overconfident once he 
postpones exercising vested options that are at least 67% in the money. The 
threshold of 67% is based on a calculation of Hall and Murphy (2002) that suggests 
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a failure to exercise an option that is 67% in the money implies a constant relative 
risk-aversion of three. Given that I do not have detailed data on CEO options 
holdings and the exercise price of each granted option, I follow Hirshleifer et al. 
(2010) and Campbell et al. (2009) in calculating an average moneyness of the 
CEO's option portfolio for each year. First, for each CEO-year, the average 
realizable value per option is calculated by dividing the total realizable value of the 
options (ExecuComp variable OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL) by the number of 
options held by the CEO (ExecuComp variable OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM). The 
strike price is calculated as the fiscal year end stock price minus the average 
realizable value. The average moneyness of the options is equal to the stock price 
divided by the estimated strike price minus 1. In these computations, only the vested 
options are included. I create (01) dummy variable (OverCEO) that has a value of 
one if the CEO's average amount of profit per share is greater than 0.67 or in 
another word the CEO is identified as overconfident, and zero otherwise. Similar to 
Hirshleifer et al. (2010), the overconfidence measure of a CEO remains unchanged 
over the sample period because the personality trait is considered persistent. 
1.4.4 Measuring market competition 
The impact of competition on innovation is well documented in the literature. 
It is generally believed that competition forces firms to allocate resources more 
efficiently. It is also a common belief that competition results in downward pressure 
on costs, decreases slack, provides incentives for the efficient organization of 
production, and even promotes innovation. Geroski (1990) find evidence that 
concentration and other measures of monopoly power tend to reduce the rate of 
innovation. Caves and Barton (1990), Green and Mayes (1991) and Caves et al. 
(1992) find that an increase in market concentration above a certain threshold tends 
to reduce technical efficiency. In contrast, a number of studies report a negative 
relationship between competition and innovation (Schumpeter 1943; Nickell 1996; 
Blundell et al. 1999). Scherer (1967) discovers a significant inverted-U shape 
relationship between the two. Based on these findings, I also control for the effect of 
competition on firm innovation. Following Nickell (1996) and Hirshleifer (2010), the 
indicator of product market competition is developed from the Lerner Index, or price 
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cost margin. According to Aghion (2006; 2009) this measure has several advantages 
over conventional measures such as market share or the Herfindahl concentration 
index. Price cost margin is the difference between operating profits net of 
depreciation and an estimated financial cost of capital, scaled by sales. The cost of 
capital is assumed to be 0.085 for all firms and time periods and the capital stock 
(Aghion 2006 and 2009). 
^ Operating profit - financial cos t 
Competition,, = — 
Sales 
The competition measure is then computed using the following equation, 
1 * 
Competition Jt = 1 Competition,, 
N jj ,=o 
where i indexes firms, j indexes industry, t indexes time, and Njt is the number 
of firms in industry j in year t. A value of 1 indicates perfect competition (price equals 
marginal cost) while values below 1 indicate some degree of market power. In 
computing the competition index, I use the entire sample of public firms in each 
industry, not only those in the NBER patent subsample. 
1.4.5 Measuring corporate governance 
Corporate governance mechanisms frequently exist simultaneously within the 
firm and are thus often synthesized and measured by aggregate indexes in the 
literature (La Porta et al. 1998; Gompers et al. 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2005). The 
commonly used indexes include the GJndex of Gompers et al. (2003) and the 
EJndex of Bebchuk et al. (2005). The GJndex is constructed based on a set of 24 
provisions that are classified into the following five groups: tactics for delaying hostile 
bidders (Delay), voting rights (Voting)-, director/officer protection (Protection); other 
takeover defenses (Other)-, and state laws (State). For every firm, one point is added 
for every provision that reduces shareholder rights. Therefore, firms with higher 
GJndex scores are referred to as having the "highest management power" or the 
"weakest shareholder rights" and vice versa. 
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The EJndex of Bebchuk et al. (2005) is an entrenchment index which is 
constructed based on six provisions. Four of them involve constitutional limitations 
on shareholders' voting power. The other two provisions can be regarded as 
"takeover readiness" provisions that boards sometimes put in place. Each company 
in their database is given a score, from zero to six, based on the number of these 
provisions that the company has in the given year or month. A higher EJndex 
implies poor shareholder rights and adverse effects on management behavior and 
incentives. 
In this study, I also include other indicators of corporate governance such as 
dual-class shares, CEO-chair duality (CEO is also a chairman), and CEO stock 
ownership. Firms with dual-class shares have poor shareholder rights because 
voting power is concentrated in shares with voting right. CEO-chair duality implies 
excessive power of the CEO and likelihood to engage in discretionary behavior. 
Insider stock ownership is an indication of the manager's entrenchment incentive. I 
control for these corporate governance measures in my estimation models because 
it has been suggested that the impacts of corporate governance practices are 
additive. 
1.4.6 Other explanatory variables 
Based on prior literature, I have a number of control variables in my empirical 
models. The control variables include firm size, sales growth, asset turnover, firm 
age, CEO age, capital expenditure, return on assets, and book leverage. Firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Sales growth is the yearly change 
in sales revenue. Return on assets (ROA) is to control for profitability. CAPEX is a 
log transformation of capital expenditure of the firm for year t. Book leverage is total 
debt divided by total assets. 
All the regressions include year and industry fixed effects, where the industry 
is defined at the 2-digit SIC level. 
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1.5 THE MODEL 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2 I run pooled OLS time series cross-sectional 
regressions and fixed effects models using panel data. My regression model has the 
following specification: 
TotalCitatioriit = c + fiiOverCEO,it + p2CEO_ChairDualityjj + 
f33LernerJndexlt + p4EJndexlit + fcDualClassu + fi6OverCEO*GJndexit + 
(37OverCEO*HighG_indexlt + j380verCE O *LowG_index,, + 
p9CEOShareOwnership*OverCEO + fi10SOX*OverCEOlt + f3nCEOAgelt + 
p12lnstitutionalOwnership,j + f313lnsiderShareHeldlt + 
PuCEOShareOwnershipit + j315FirmAgelt + p16ROAitt + /317dSALEu + 
fi-isBLEVjj + p19CAPEXit + Hu (1) 
where 
Total Citation is the total number of citations summed across all patents 
applied for during the year. OverCEO is a (01) dummy variable that has a value of 1 
if the CEO is considered overconfident, and equals zero otherwise. A CEO is 
considered overconfident if he failed to exercise vested options that are at least 67% 
in-the-money. CEO/Chair duality is a (01) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the 
CEO is also the board chairman, and is zero otherwise. Dual-class shares is a (01) 
dummy that has a value of 1 if the firm has dual-class equity, and equals zero 
otherwise. OverCEO*G_lndex is an interaction variable between CEO 
overconfidence and corporate governance. ChairDuality*OverCEO is an interaction 
variable between CEO/Chair duality and CEO overconfidence. SOX*OverCEO is an 
interaction variable between the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley and CEO overconfidence. 
SOX is a (01) dummy variable that has a value of 1 in the years before 2003, and is 
0 otherwise. CEO_shares_held is the percentage of CEO stock ownership excluding 
options. Among the control variables, dSALE is sales growth measured as the log of 
firm sales divided by prior year sales. ROA is return on assets, computed as 
operating income before depreciation to book assets. Book leverage is ratio of total 
debt to book assets. Firm age is calculated as the difference between the year the 
firm applied for patent and the year the firm is first established, after taking into 
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account ownership changes due to merger and acquisition activity. CAPEX is the log 
of capital expenditure. 
To examine whether overconfident CEOs invest in firm innovation to benefit 
personal interests or shareholders (hypothesis 2), I investigate the effect of firm 
innovation by overconfident CEOs on firm performance. The following model is used: 
LeadMTB,, = c + fiiOverCEOit + (32TotalCitationlt + 
(33OverCEO*lnnovationlt + fi4OverCE O * Innovation *G_indexli , + 
fi5OverCE O * Innovation *High GJndexlt + f36OverCEO*lnnovation*LowGJndeXjt + 
f37G_lndeXjt + faCEOShareOwnership + faCEOAgeiit + f310Sizelit + 
(311Salechg_ATjt + (S12BLEV,J + j313Competitionlt + (2a) 
LeadROAit = c + fiiOverCEO^ + foOverCE 0 *lnnovation, t + 
p3OverCEO*lnnovation*G_indexit + faOverCE O *ln novation *High GJndex j t + 
p5OverCEO*lnnovation*LowGJndex,t + f56DualTitleu + frSizeit + 
PsSaletoAssetSit + /39Competitionu + qlit (2b) 
LeadSaleGrowthlt = c + faOverCEOjj + f52TotalCitationit + 
(33OverCEO*lnnovationl}, + (54OverCEO*lnnovation *G_indexit + 
/350verCE O * Innovation *HighG_index, t + f36OverCEO*lnnovation*LowGJndeXj,t + 
PeDualTitle*OverCEOi, + p10Sizeu + faCEOAgeu + PuFirmAge,,, + (512CAPXiit + 
fi13Competitionit + qu (2c) 
where Firm Performance is measured by Tobin's q, ROA, and sales growth, 
respectively. Tobin's q is calculated by dividing the market value of a company by 
total assets (Villaloonga and Amit 2006). 
1.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics of selected variables of the sample. It 
is shown that the distribution of innovative activity in this sample is highly skewed. 
Total citation count has a mean of 143.9 and a median of 3.00; patent grants has a 
mean of 80.57 and a median of 13. The CEO overconfidence indicator is also 
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skewed with a mean of 0.34 and a median of 0. The firms are on average seasoned 
operations with a mean (median) firm age of 32.95 (33.0). CEO age has mean of 
55.84 and a median of 56. The mean market competition index of 0.92 implies that 
the sampled firms are in highly competitive industries, which might be a factor 
responsible for the need to pursue innovative activity. Another implication of the 
highly competitive market is that the overconfident CEOs are likely subject to the 
discipline of market pressure, making self-interested managerial behavior less likely. 
There is, however, no clear evidence that the sampled firms are well-governanced. 
Institutional ownership of the sampled firms has a mean of 86% and a median of 
87%, only a few firms in the sample have dual-class equity, but the CEO/Chair 
duality dummy variable has a mean (median) value of 0.65 (1.0), suggesting that 
many CEOs of the sampled firms are powerful because they are also the board 
chairpersons. Concentration of power in the hands of the CEO may lead to 
discretionary managerial behavior. In addition, both the mean (9.67) and median 
(10.0) of GJndex are slightly higher than those reported by Gompers et al (2003). 
On the other hand, the mean (2.39) and median (3.00) of EJndex are slightly 
smaller than those reported by Bebchuk et al. (2003). On average, the descriptive 
statistics show that the sampled firms are large, profitable, and have a relatively low 
leverage. The firms have a mean and median market-to-book ratio of 1.97 and 1.35, 
respectively. Sales growth has a mean of 11.22% and a median of 8.46%. 
*** Insert table 1.1 about here *** 
Table 1.2 shows the correlation coefficients among the major variables used 
in the estimation models of this study. All the coefficients are relative small in 
magnitude and are well within the standard acceptable range. 
*** Insert table 1.2 about here *** 
In Table 1.3a, I report the results on the effect of CEO overconfidence on firm 
innovation. The dependent variable is log(1+ total citation count). All the four model 
specifications in Table 1.3a have a relatively strong explanatory power as the 
average adjusted R-square is about 0.33. In this table, the pooled OLS regression 
technique is used. In the first two models, CEO overconfidence is positively related 
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to firm innovation with a significance level of 1 percent. This finding is consistent with 
those of Hirshleifer et al. (2010) and Galasso and Simcoe (2010). The focus in Table 
1.3a is the effect of corporate governance on CEO overconfidence. In model 1, the 
coefficient of G_index*OverCEO is -0.843 and significant at the one percent level. It 
implies that poor corporate governance practices (high GJndex) discourages 
overconfident CEOs to invest in innovative projects. The result is consistent with the 
implication that uncontrolled overconfident CEOs prefer to protect personal interests 
without assuming risk. This is consistent with the findings of many studies on agency 
problems. In model 2 and model 4, the coefficient on HighG index*OverCEO is 
negative and significant at one percent and 10%, respectively; confirming the 
observation in model 1. Interestingly, in models 3 and 4, the coefficient on 
LowGJndex*OverCEO is positive and significant at the 10% level. The result 
suggests that overconfident CEOs, when monitored by good corporate governance 
practices, invest more in innovative projects. That is, overconfident CEOs are 
encouraged to assume risk when agency problems are controlled. This finding is 
consistent with John et al. (2008) that good governance is associated with risk-taking 
incentives. Recall that the first objective of my study is to examine if overconfident 
CEOs overinvest in innovative projects. The result just reported sheds some light on 
my first objective. Prior literature shows that well-governanced firms can help 
overconfident CEOs make fewer mistakes in acquisition activity. Analogically, my 
results suggest that overconfident CEOs of well-governanced firms make fewer 
mistakes when selecting risky innovative projects. That is, the positive coefficient on 
LowGJndex*OverCEO suggests that well-governanced overconfident CEOs select 
innovative projects that are likely good but risky. Given that overconfidence is not an 
agency problem; the good but risky innovative projects chosen by overconfident 
CEOs are not overinvestments. On the other hand, the significant negative 
coefficient on HighGJndex*OverCEO is consistent with the implication that firms 
with poor governance practices cause overconfident CEOs to refrain from investing 
in innovative projects, that is, they underinvest (invest inadequately) in innovation 
activity. My result is strong because adding the control for other proxies of corporate 
governance mechanisms such as CEO/Chair duality, dual-class equity, CEO stock 
ownership, and the impact of SOX does not reduce the significance of the impact of 
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GJndex on overconfident CEOs. In addition, the other corporate governance 
mechanisms have coefficients that are significant with the expected sign. 
*** Insert table 1.3A about here *** 
In Table 1.3b, I repeat the above regression analysis using fixed effects 
models to control for the problem of missing variables. Results are stronger than 
using the pooled OLS regression technique. The sign of the coefficient on OverCEO 
is positive and significant at the one percent level in all the four models, confirming 
the results in prior literature. HighGJndex*OverCEO is significantly negative at the 
one percent level in model 2 and model 4. LowGJndex*OverCEO also has a 
significant positive coefficient in model3 and model 4. In addition, the adjusted R 
squares are about 50% higher than those in table 1.3a with an average value of 
0.49. 
*** Insert table 1.3B about here *** 
In Table 1.4a, I use EJndex instead of GJndex as the measure of corporate 
governance. The result in Table 1.4a is very similar and consistent with that reported 
in Table 1.3a. The coefficient on OverCEO is positive and significant in all the 4 
specifications. HighEJndex*OverCEO has a significant negative coefficient in model 
2 and model 4. The coefficient on LowEJndex "OcerCEO has a significant positive 
coefficient in models 3 and 4. 
Results of the fixed effects models using E-index in Table 1.4b are weaker. 
The coefficient on OverCEO is insignificant in all the four model specifications. 
Similar to the results in other tables, the coefficient on HighEJndex*OverCEO is 
negative and significant at the one percent level in models 2 and 4. However, the 
coefficient of LowEJndex*OverCEO is not significant in either model 3 or model 4. 
*** Insert table 1.4A about here *** 
In Tables 1.5 to 1.7, I report results pertaining to the second objective of my 
study. That is, I report results that answer the question whether overconfident CEOs 
invest in innovative projects to enhance firm value or personal benefits. Hirshleifer et 
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al. (2010) find inconclusive evidence regarding the effect of CEO overconfidence on 
firm performance. 
In panel A of Table 1.5, the dependent variable is Tobin's Q. We follow 
Villaloonga and Amit (2006) in measuring Tobin's Q as market value divided by book 
assets. All the four models in Table 1.5 have relatively high explanatory power as the 
average adjusted R-square is about 0.41. The coefficient on OverCEO is positive 
and significant at the one percent level in all the four models. This finding is 
consistent with the result of Hirshleifer et al. (2010). The coefficient on innovation is 
positive in all the four models but significant only in model 1 and model 3. The 
coefficient on OverCEO*lnnovation, however, is positive and significant in all the four 
models despite the level of significance is only 10% in the last three models. Our 
focus in this table is on the effect of corporate governance. In model 1, 
OverCEO*lnnovation*Glndex has a negative but insignificant coefficient. In models 2 
and 4, OverCEO*lnnovation*HighGindex has a negative coefficient that is significant 
at the one percent level. The result indicates that innovative projects made by 
overconfident CEOs of poorly-governanced firms have a strong negative impact on 
firm value. The finding is consistent with the implication that overconfident CEOs of 
firms with poor governance, if left uncontrolled, might end up accepting too many 
risky projects that have low expected payoffs. As a result, firm value is reduced. On 
the other hand, the coefficient on OverCEO*lnnovation*LowG_index is positive in 
both models 3 and 4, despite only significant at the 10 percent level in model 3. The 
positive coefficient on OverCEO*lnnovation*LowG_index implies that well-
governanced overconfident CEOs pursue risky innovative projects to enhance firm 
value. Panel B of Table 1.5 presents the result using fixed effect models. The 
coefficient on OverCEO remains positive and significant at the one percent level in 
all the four models. The coefficient on innovation is also significant and positive in 
the models. The coefficient on OverCEO*lnnovation is positive in model 1 but 
negative in the remaining three models. OverCEO*lnnovation has a negative 
coefficient that is significant at the one percent level. Unlike the pooled OLS 
regression results, the coefficient of OverCEO*lnnovation*HighGindex is insignificant 
in model 2 and model 4; whereas the coefficient of OverCEO*lnnovation*LowGindex 
is positive and significant at the one percent level in models 3 and 4. In short, 
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regression results on the relation between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation 
provide some evidence that are consistent with the implication that well-governanced 
firms can monitor overconfident CEOs to accept innovative projects that are risky but 
good and enhance firm value. On the other hand, poorly-governanced firms could 
not deter overconfident CEOs in accepting innovative projects that are bad and have 
low expected payoffs, resulting in losses of firm value. 
*** Insert table 1.5A,B about here *** 
The firm performance measure is Table 1.6A and 1.6B is return on assets 
(ROA). In table 1.6A, CEO confidence has a weak impact on ROA. The coefficient 
on OverCEO is insignificant in models 1 and 2, and significant only at the 10 percent 
level in models 3 and 4. OverCEO*lnnovation is positive and significant at the one 
percent level in model one, but OverCEO*lnnovation*Gindex is negative and 
significant at the one percent level in the same model. The coefficient on 
OverCEO*lnnovation*HighGindex is negative and significant at the 10 percent level 
only in model 2. On the other hand, the coefficient on 
OverCEO*lnnovation*LowGindex is positive and significant at the one percent level 
in models 3 and 4. In short, there is strong evidence that the investment in innovative 
projects by overconfident CEOs of well-governanced firms improves the return on 
assets; but the negative impact on the ROA of poorly-governance firms is relatively 
weak. Overall, the results are consistent with those in Tables 1.5A and 1.5B where 
firm performance is measured by Tobin's q. 
*** Insert table 1.6A,B about here *** 
In Tables 1.7A and 1.7B, firm performance is measured by the growth of 
sales. Unlike the results in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, all the salient variables have 
insignificant coefficients. Therefore, it is unable to determine if the investment in 
innovative projects by overconfident CEOs represent efforts to benefit self-interests 
or the interest of shareholders. 
*** Insert table 1.7A,B about here *** 
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In sum, the result in Tables 1.5 to 1.7 shows evidence that overconfident 
CEOs innovate to increase (decrease) firm value if the firm has good (bad) corporate 
governance practices. 
Computing the economic impact of regression variables from 
regression coefficients (Table 3a): 
In table 1.3A with Log_TotalCitation is a proxy of firm innovation, regressing 
LogTotalCitation on LogGindex*OverCEO among others gives a coefficient of 
LogGindex*OverCEO of -0.843. To find the economic impact of increase LogGindex 
(worse Corporate Governance practices) interacted with Overconfident CEO from 
the 1st to the 3rd quartile: we first multiply -0.843 by interquantitle of 
LogGindex*OverCEO of 1.946 (table 1.3 -panel C) which results in -1.640. This 
gives the decrease in the dependent variable associated with an increase in 
LogGindex*OverCEO from the 1st to the 3rd quartile of the distribution. Then we 
compare this decrease in firm innovation to the average firm innovation across firms. 
This comparison shows that an increase in LogGindex*OverCEO from the 1st to the 
3rd quartile of the distribution results in a -64.37% (= -1.64/2.548) decrease in firm 
innovation relative to the cross-sectional mean of LogTotalCitation. 
*** Insert table 1.3C about here *** 
The base model (2) table 1.3A shows that with the options-based measure, 
HighGindex interacted with Overconfident managers are negatively associated with 
significantly lower total citation (p < 0.01). The coefficient in model (1) table 1.3A 
shows that having an HighGindex*OverconfidentCEO decreases Log(1 + 
totalcitation) by -0.247. From Table 1.3 panel D, the mean number of totalcitation for 
non-HighGindex*Overconfident managers is 287.2, implying log(1 -(-totalcitation) of 
5.664. So HighGindex*OverconfidentCEO decreases this variable by 0.247, to 
5.417. This implies an decrease in the number of totalcitation to exp(5.417) - 1 = 
224.13. This represents a decrease in the number of totalcitation by (224.13/287.2) -
1= -21.96%. 
*** Insert table 1.3D. here *** 
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The base model (1) table 1.3A also shows that with the options-based 
measure, LowGindex interacted with Overconfident managers are positively 
associated with significantly higher total citation (p < 0.01). The coefficient in model 
(3) table 1.3A shows that having an LowGindex*OverconfidentCEO increases Log(1 
+ totalcitation) by +0.245. From Table 1.3 panel E, the mean number of totalcitation 
for non-LowGindex*Overconfident managers is 155.63, implying log(1 ̂ totalcitation) 
of 5.054. So LowGindex*OverconfidentCEO increases this variable by 0.245, to 
5.299. This implies an increase in the number of totalcitation to exp(5.299) - 1 = 
199.11. This represents an increase in the number of totalcitation by (199.11/155.63) 
- 1 = +27.94%. 
*** Insert table 1.3E about here *** 
1.7 ROBUSTNESS TEST 
For robustness purpose, I repeat all of the above tests using patent count as 
the measure of innovation. Patent count is calculated by logarithm transformation of 
number of Patent grouped by "GVKEY" and "Year Patent applied for" in the NBER 
Patent database files. Tables 1.8A and 8B report descriptive statistics and Pearson 
correlation and p-value for Patent count models. 
*** Insert table 1.8A,B about here *** 
In Tables 1.9A and 9B, I report results on the relation between innovation and 
CEO overconfidence. The result in Table 1.9A is very similar and consistent with 
that reported in Table 1.3A and 1.3B. The coefficient on OverCEO is positive and 
significant in all the 4 specifications. HighG_index*OverCEO has a significant 
negative coefficient in model 2. The coefficient on LowGJndex "OverCEO has a 
significant positive coefficient in models 3. The results imply that poorly-governanced 
(well-governanced) overconfident CEOs select innovative projects that are likely bad 
(good) but risky. Given that overconfidence is not an agency problem; the bad 
(good) but risky innovative projects chosen by overconfident CEOs are (not) 
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overinvestments. These results pertaining the first objective of my study are 
consistent with those reported in Tables 1.3 to 1.4. 
*** Insert table 1.9A,B about here *** 
In Tables 1.10 to 1.11, I report the robustness test result on the relation 
between innovations made by overconfident CEOs and firm performance. The 
results pertaining to the second objective of my study are also consistent with those 
reported in Tables 1.5 to 1.7. 
*** Insert table 1.10A,B about here *** 
*** Insert table 1.11A,B about here *** 
*** Insert table 1.12A,B about here *** 
1.8 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, I examine if overconfident CEOs overinvest or underinvest in 
innovative projects. I also investigate if overconfident CEOs pursue innovative 
projects to benefit personal interests or the interest of shareholders. By focusing on 
the effect of corporate governance in monitoring the behavior of overconfident 
CEOs, my results show there is a positive relation between CEO overconfidence and 
firm innovation for firms that have good governance practices. For these well-
governanced firms, the overconfident CEOs do not overinvest because good risky 
projects are accepted. My results also show that there is a negative relation between 
CEO overconfidence and firm innovation among firms with poor governance. In 
these cases, the finding is consistent with the implication that overconfident CEO are 
entrenched and invest inadequately in innovative projects when the firm has poor 
corporate governance. The other important result of my study is that well-
governanced firms could influence the behavior of overconfident CEOs so that firm 
performance (measured by Tobin's q, ROA, and sales growth) is enhanced. On the 
other hand, it is also found that overconfident CEOs of poorly-governanced firms 
31 
might pursue innovative projects so aggressively that projects with low expected 
payoff are accepted and results in poorer firm performance. 
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics of the sampled firms 
Variable N Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std Dev 
TotalCitation 1,729 16,291.00 0.00 143.94 3.00 954.52 
OverCeo_dummies 1,729 1.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.47 
Firmage 1,729 57.00 1.00 32.95 33.00 18.68 
CEOage 1,729 89.00 35.00 55.84 56.00 7.24 
TitleDual_dummies 1,729 1.00 0.00 0.66 1.00 0.48 
Competition 1,729 1.00 0.60 0.92 0.92 0.06 
GJndex 1,729 18.00 3.00 9.67 10.00 2.73 
EJndex 1,729 6.00 0.00 2.39 3.00 1.32 
InstShareOwned 1,729 1.35 0.27 0.86 0.87 0.13 
InsiderShareOwned 1,729 43.99 0.00 1.99 0.66 4.30 
CEOShareOwned 1,729 1,32 0.00 0.0094 0.00025 0.079 
DualClass_dummies 1,729 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.25 
SOX_dummies 1,729 1.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.48 
Size (in $million) 1,729 750,507.00 109.15 13,917.39 3,346.65 47,525.58 
MTB 1,729 26.30 0.02 1.97 1.35 2.07 
SaleToAssets 1,729 4.29 0.10 0.95 0.87 0.51 
CAPX (in $million) 1,729 33,143.00 0.63 663.13 139.90 2,307.61 
ROA 1,729 48.15 -290.84 5.26 5.94 11.42 
EBITDAtoSALE 1,729 0.33 -1.74 0.01 0.01 0.07 
Book Leverage 1,729 144.04 0.00 23.10 22.77 16.61 
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Table 1.2. Pearson correlations and p-value among key variables 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 

















































































FirmAge 0.010 -0.101 0.179 0.100 0.111 -0.092 -0.062 0.210 1.000 
0.685 <0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 0.011 <0001 
CEOAge 0.036 0.024 0.061 0.275 -0.067 -0.005 0.096 0.075 0.029 1.000 
0.141 0.315 0.011 <.0001 0.006 0.827 <0001 0.002 0.231 
CAPX 0.288 -0.048 0.019 0.208 -0.109 0.047 0.115 0.902 0.206 0.101 1.000 
<.0001 0.048 0.443 <.0001 <0001 0.054 <.0001 <0001 <.0001 <0001 
ROA -0.053 0.184 0.073 0.075 -0.028 0.021 0.080 0.051 0.084 0.048 0.063 1.000 
0.029 <0001 0.003 0.002 0.239 0.388 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.049 0.009 
DAT 0.020 -0.154 0.094 0.145 0.002 0.004 -0.042 0.193 0.102 0.063 0.160 -0.251 1.000 
0.418 <.0001 <.0001 <0001 0.921 0.864 0.085 <.0001 <.0001 0.009 <0001 <0001 
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Table 1.3A. Relation between firm innovation and CEO overconfidence (Pooled 
OLS regressions). GJndex is the measure of corporate governance 
This table shows the results from pooled OLS regressions Total citation count as 
dependent variable and G_lndex*OverCEO; LowG_lndex*OverCEO; 
HighG_lndex*OverCEO ChairDuality*OverCEO; DualClass*OverCEO; SOX*OverCEO 
and CEO share ownership*OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. Dependent 
variable is firm innovation proxied by total citation which count total number of citations 
summed across all patents applied for during the year, NBER Patent database files. 
OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years 
after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*G_lndex; 
OverCEO*G_lndex; DualityTitle*OverCEO; Dualclass*OverCEO; SOX*OverCEO and 
CEOShareOwnership*OverCEO all are interactions of two categorized variables between 
an indicator variable of OverCEO variable and the interacted variables. Institutional share 
ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held 
by an institutional investor. CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, 
excluding options, Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share 
ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held 
by CEO. ROA is return on assets. Growth in Sales is calculated as natural logarithm of 
ratio of salet to saleM. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All 
COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are 
included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the 
period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 1,729 observations. 
Expected 
VarName signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept + or- 0.875 1.257 0.979 0.729 
[0.602] [0.864] [0.672] [0.905] 
OverCeo + 2.195*" 0.505*** 0.250 -0.051 
[4.147] [2.932] [1.421] [-0.503] 
CEO/Chair duality - -0.423*** -0.415*** -0.415*** -0.094 
[-3.759] [-3.695] [-3.689] [-1.516] 
Competition + 1.633" 1.600" 1.618" -0.028 
[2.310] [2.262] [2.283] [-0.071] 
Dual-class chares + 0.560"* 0.566"* 0.557"* 0.008 
[2.797] [2.828] [2.777] [0.072] 
ChairDuality*OverCEO + 0.218 0.215 0.176 0.322"* 
[1.201] [1.182] [0.971] [3.194] 
LogGJndexOverceo - -0.843*** 
[-3.611] 








SoxOverceo - -0.549"* -0.573*** -0.564*** -0.137 
[-3.010] [-3.142] [-3.085] [-1.360] 
DualClass*OverCEO - -0.737" -0.769" -0.725" 0.241 
[-2.151] [-2.242] [-2.111] [1.265] 
CEOShareOwned*Overceo + 0.058*** 0.060*" 0.056"* -0.006 
[2.977] [3.098] [2.881] [-0.595] 
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Table 1.3A. (continued) 
Expected 
VarName signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Size + or- 0.211*** 0.213*** 0.206*** -0.037 
[2.884] [2.912] [2.815] [-0.910] 
Growth in sales - -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.000 
[-1.893] [-1.822] [-1.748] [-0.388] 
Sale to Assets - -0.515*** -0.527*** -0.516*** -0.106** 
[-5.495] [-5.632] [-5.485] [-2.047] 
Firm Age + or- 0.015 0.020 0.004 0.046 
[0.295] [0.391] [0.087] [1.635] 
CEO Age - -0.178 -0.269 -0.193 -0.327* 
[-0.541] [-0.815] [-0,582] [-1.782] 
CAPX + 0.210*** 0.206*** 0.213*** 0.150*** 
[3.266] [3.204] [3.304] [4.212] 
ROA - -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.003 
[-3.915] [-4.014] [-4.048] [-1.222] 
Book Leverage (DAT) - -1.188*** -1.187*** -1.196*** -0.014 
[-4.020] [-4.017] [-4.035] [-0.087] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3418 0.3422 0.3398 0.3098 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.3B: Relation between firm innovation and CEO overconfidence (Fixed 
effects models). G Jndex is the measure of corporate governance 
This table shows the results from fixed effects models using Total citation count as 
dependent variable and GJndex'OverCEO; LowG_lndex*OverCEO; 
HighG_lndex*OverCEO ChairDuaIity*OverCEO; DuaIClass*OverCEO; SOX*OverCEO 
and CEO share ownership*OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. Dependent 
variable is firm innovation proxied by total citation which count total number of citations 
summed across all patents applied for during the year, NBER Patent database files. 
OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years 
after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*G_lndex; 
OverCEO*G_lndex; DualityTitle*OverCEO; Dualclass*OverCEO; SOX*OverCEO and 
CEOShareOwnership*OverCEO all are interactions of two categorized variables between 
an indicator variable of OverCEO variable and the interacted variables. Institutional share 
ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held 
by an institutional investor. CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, 
excluding options, Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share 
ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held 
by CEO. ROA is return on assets. Growth in Sales is calculated as natural logarithm of 
ratio of salet to saleM. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All 
COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are 
included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the 
period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 227 cross sections x 9 timeseries. 
Expected 
Variable signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept + or- 2.415 2.796* 2.511 2.692* 
[1.479] [1.718] [1.542] [1.658] 
OverCeo + 3.088*" 1.349*" 1.058"* 1.198*** 
[4.790] [7.872] [6.040] [6.439] 
CEO/Chair duality - -0.219* -0.211* -0.212* -0.211* 
[-1.871] [-1.803] [-1.813] [-1.811] 
Competition + 2.187*" 2.150*" 2.150*" 2.103*** 
[2.905] [2.857] [2.842] [2.801] 
Dual-class chares + 0.588"* 0.593"* 0.585*** 0.594*** 
[2.759] [2.786] [2.749] [2.788] 
ChairDuality*OverCEO + 0.125 0.116 0.086 0.129 











SoxOverceo - -1.993*** -2.025*** -1.998*** -2.003*** 
[-15.572] [-15.712] [-15.438] [-15.577] 
DualClass*OverC EO - -0.680* -0.713" -0.679* -0.749" 
[-1.922] [-1.978] [-1.955] [-2.119] 
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Table 1.3B (continued) 
Expected 
Variable signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CEOShareOwned*Overceo + 0.050" 0.052*" 0.047" 0.048** 
[2.442] [2.558] [2.309] [2.340] 
Size + or- -0.169" -0.169" -0.173" -0.173" 
[-2.279] [-2.291] [-2.340] [-2.349] 
Growth in sales - -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
[-1.493] [-1.465] [-1.403] [-1.487] 
Sale to Assets - -0.471*" -0.483*** -0.468*" -0.467*** 
[-4.835] [-4.989] [-4.825] [-4.819] 
Firm Age + or - -0.016 -0.013 -0.026 -0.013 
[-0.299] [-0.224] [-0.479] [-0.235] 
CEO Age - -0.091 -0.181 -0.109 -0.165 
[-0.244] [-0.487] [-0.292] [-0.445] 
CAPX + 0.502*** 0.500*** 0.504*** 0.503*" 
[7.384] [7.393] [7.393] [7.431] 
ROA - -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013"* -0.013*" 
[-3.145] [-3.293] [-3.284] [-3.270] 
Book Leverage (DAT) - -0.404 -0.406 -0.397 -0.359 
[-1.367] [-1.373] [-1.333] [-1.210] 
R-squared 0.4896 0,4873 0.4803 0.4921 
... .. ancj. denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 1.3C. Firm-level summary statistics for Log_Gindex*OverCEO and 
Log_TotalCitation 
75% Q3 50% Median MEAN 25% Q1 Interquartile 
Log TotalCitation 4.234 2.079 2.548 0.000 4.234 
Log_GindexOverCEO 1.946 0.000 0.738 0.000 1.946 
Table 1.3D. Firm-level summary statistics for HighGindex'OverCEO and 
NonHighGindex*OverCEO 
H ighG_index*OverC EO Nori H ighG_index*OverC EO 
(N=459) (N=1269) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median 
TotalCitation 102.35 7.00 287.20 7.00 
Size 8.331 8.365 8.256 7.994 
LogCAPX 5.072 5.074 5.000 4.890 
ROA 5.640 5.440 5.535 6.350 
DAT 0.261 0.259 0.211 0.205 
Competition 0.922 0.918 0.916 0.917 
Table 1.3E. Firm-level summary statistics for LowGindex*OverCEO and 
Nonl_owGindex*OverCEO 
LowG index*OverCEO NonLowG index*OverCEO 
(N=409) (N=1319) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median 
TotalCitation 504.05 10 155.63 6.00 
Size 8.306 7.825 8.267 8.220 
LogCAPX 5.065 4.738 5.005 4.997 
ROA 5.618 6.750 5.546 5.910 
DAT 0.189 0.168 0.235 0.237 
Competition 0.916 0.915 0.918 0.917 
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Table 1.4A: Relation between firm innovation and CEO overconfidence (Pooled 
OLS regressions). EJndex is the measure of corporate governance. 
This table shows the results from pooled OLS regressions using Total citation count as 
dependent variable and E_lndex*OverCEO; LowE_lndex*OverCEO; 
HighE_lndex*OverCEO ChairDuality*OverCEO; DuaIClass*OverCEO; SOX*OverCEO 
and CEO share ownership*OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. Dependent 
variable is firm innovation proxied by total citation which count total number of citations 
summed across all patents applied for during the year, NBER Patent database files. 
OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years 
after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*E_lndex; 
OverCEO*E_lndex; DualityTitle*OverCEO; Dualclass*OverCEO; SOX*OverCEO and 
CEOShareOwnership*OverCEO all are interactions of two categorized variables between 
an indicator variable of OverCEO variable and the interacted variables. 
Low(High)E_lndex*OverCEO are interaction variables in which the natural logarithm of 
EJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). CEO_shares_ownership is 
stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total 
assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding 
common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on assets. Growth in Sales is calculated as 
natural logarithm of ratio of salet to saleM. Book leverage is total debt to book value of 
total assets. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million 
dollars are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000-
6999) by the period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 1,339 observations. 
Expected 
Variable signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept + or- -0.318 -0.349 -0.733 -0.355 
[-0.13] [-0.14] [-0.29] [-0.14] 
OverCeo + 1.887"* 1.295"* 0.601* 1.163"* 
[5.04] [3.90] [1.89] [3.43] 
CEO/Chair duality - -0.460*" -0.461*" -0.465*** -0.460*** 
[-3.26] [-3.27] [-3.27] [-3.26] 
Competition + 1.493* 1.591* 1.515* 1.577* 
[1.72] [1.83] [1.73] [1.81] 
ChairDuality*OverCEO + 0.421* 0.416* 0.354 0.455" 
[1.87] [1.84] [1.56] [2.01] 
GJndexOverceo - -1.008*** 
[-5.73] 








SoxOverceo - -0.574** -0.613" -0.638*** -0.586** 
[-2.35] [-2.52] [-2.60] [-2.40] 
DualClass*OverCEO - -0.671 -0.685 -0.554 -0.673 
[-1.09] [-1.11] [-0.89] [-1.09] 
CEOShareOwned*Overceo + or - -0.101" -0.110" -0.071 -0.109" 
[-2.12] [-2.29] [-1.50] [-2.29] 
Dual-class chares + 0.373 0.366 0.370 0.373 
[1.05] [1.02] [1.03] [105] 
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Table 1.4A. (continued) 
Expected 
Variable signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CEOShareOwned + 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.105*** 
[3.60] [3.58] [3.49] [3.60] 
Size + or - 0.156* 0.139 0.191** 0.143 
[1.73] [1.54] [2.10] [1.57] 
Growth in sales - -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
[-1.48] [-1.46] [-1.46] [-1.46] 
Sale to Assets - -0.418*** -0.436*** -0.431*** -0.428*** 
[-3.47] [-3.62] [-3.55] [-3.56] 
Firm Age + or - -0.018 -0.020 -0.024 -0.014 
[-0.29] [-0.32] [-0.38] [-0.22] 
CEO Age - -0.130 -0.105 -0.061 -0.106 
[-0.32] [-0.26] [-0.15] [-0.26] 
CAPX + 0.254*** 0.277*** 0.232*** 0.267*** 
[3.19] [3.46] [2.89] [3.34] 
ROA - -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
[-4.04] [-4.05] [-4.01] [-4.02] 
Book Leverage (DAT) - -0.853** -0.950*** -0.999*** -0.916** 
[-2.34] [-2.61] [-2.73] [-2.52] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3108 0.3085 0.2992 0.3123 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 1.4B: Relation between firm innovation and CEO overconfidence (Fixed 
effects models). EJndex is the measure of corporate governance. 
This table shows the results from fixed effects models using Total citation count as 
dependent variable and E_lndex*OverCEO; LowEJndex*OverCEO; 
HighEJndex*OverCEO ChairDuaIity*OverCEO; DualClass*OverCEO; SOX*OverCEO 
and CEO share ownership*OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. Dependent 
variable is firm innovation proxied by total citation which count total number of citations 
summed across all patents applied for during the year, NBER Patent database files. 
OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years 
after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*EJndex; 
OverCEO*E_lndex; DualityTitle*OverCEO; Dualclass*OverCEO; SOX*OverCEO and 
CEOShareOwnership*OverCEO all are interactions of two categorized variables between 
an indicator variable of OverCEO variable and the interacted variables. 
Low(High)E_lndex*OverCEO are interaction variables in which the natural logarithm of 
EJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). CEO_shares_ownership is 
stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total 
assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding 
common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on assets. Growth in Sales is calculated as 
natural logarithm of ratio of salet to saleM. Book leverage is total debt to book value of 
total assets. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million 
dollars are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000-
6999) by the period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 1,339 observations. 
Expected 
Variable signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept + or - -3.155 -2.979 -3.263 -3.004 
[-1.47] [-1.39] [-1.51] [-1.40] 
OverCeo + 0.251 -0.044 -0.322 -0.054 
[0.96] [-0.20] [-1.61] [-0.24] 
CEO/Chair duality - -0.168 -0.169 -0.152 -0.169 
[-1.63] [-1.63] [-1.46] [-1.63] 
Competition + -0.308 -0.371 -0.266 -0.368 
[-0.62] [-0.75] [-0.53] [-0.74] 
Dual-class chares + 1.719*" 1.671*** 1.661*" 1.679"* 
[3.95] [3.84] [3.79] [3.85] 
ChairDuality*OverCEO + 0.370" 0.367" 0.326" 0.369" 
[2.49] [2.46] [2.19] [2.47] 
GJndexOverceo - -0.464*** 
[-3.24] 








SoxOverceo - 0.233* 0.230* 0.202 0.231* 
[1.70] [1.67] [1.47] [1.68] 
DualClass*OverCEO - 1.170*** 1.235*** 1.291*" 1.229*** 
[2.68] [2.83] [2.95] [2.81] 
CEOShareOwned*Overceo + or- 0.023 0.020 0.038 0.020 
[0.71] [0.60] [1.19] [0.60] 
49 
Table 1.4B (continued) 
Expected 
Variable signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CEOShareOwned + -0.011 -0.010 -0.015 -0.010 
[-0.39] [-0.38] [-0.54] [-0.38] 
Size + or- 0.346" 0.305* 0.361" 0.308* 
[2.15] [1.88] [2.23] [1.89] 
Growth in sales - -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
[-0.59] [-0.36] [-0.48] [-0.37] 
Sale to Assets - 0.414* 0.385* 0.408* 0.388* 
[1.79] [1.66] [1.75] [1.67] 
Firm Age + or - -0.016 -0.018 -0.020 -0.018 
[-0.29] [-0.34] [-0.36] [-0.33] 
CEO Age - 0.015 0.068 0.010 0.067 
[0.04] [0.18] [0.03] [0.18] 
CAPX + -0.103 -0.096 -0.102 -0.096 
[-1.40] [-1.30] [-137] [-1.30] 
ROA - 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
[0.91] [0.89] [0.84] [0.89] 
Book Leverage (DAT) - 0.276 0.307 0.321 0.305 
[0-70] [0.78] [0.81] [0-77] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5598 0.5586 0.5554 0.5586 
Number of Cross Sections x Time Series 
Length 266x9  266x9  267x9  268x9  
"*, ", and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.5A. CEO over-confidence, firm innovation, and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Tobin's Q. Tobin's q is market value divided by book 
assets (Villaloonga and Amit 2006). Pooled OLS regression results. 
This table shows the results from pooled OLS regression using Total citation count as 
dependent variable and GJndex'OverCEO; LowG_lndex*OverCEO; and 
HighGJndex*OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. OverCEO is an indicator 
variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years after the CEO holds 
options that are at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*GJndex; OverCEO*GJndex is 
interaction of two categorized variables between an indicator variable of OverCEO and 
the interacted variable of GJndex. Low(High)GJndex*OverCEO are interaction 
variables in which the natural logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 
3rd quintitle). CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, 
Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is 
percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is 
return on assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All 
COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are 
included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the 
period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 1,771 observations. 
Expected 
VarName signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept +  o r - 3.915*** 3.959"* 3.865*" 3.951*** 
[11.002] [10.872] [11.009] [10.975] 
OverCeo + 0.163*** 0.166*" 0.166*" 0.166*** 
[5.911] [6.224] [6.215] [6.211] 
Innovation + 0.013" 0.009 0.012* 0.009 
[2.183] [1.565] [1.929] [1.527] 
OverCEOJnnovation + 0.022" 0.018* 0.018* 0.017* 
[2.035] [1.921] [1.955] [1.919] 
OverCEOJnnovation_Gindex - -0.006 
[-0.999] 








CEOShareOwned + 0.046*" 0.044"* 0.045*" 0.044*" 
[8.921] [8.926] [8.919] [8.994] 
CEOAge - -0.607"* -0.609"* -0.597"* -0.608*** 
[-7.575] [-7.692] [-7.516] [-7.741] 
Competition + 0.989"* 0.992"* 0.989"* 0.992"* 
[7.853] [7.994] [7.810] [7.987] 
Size - -0.055"* -0.054"* -0.055*" -0.054*** 
[-6.246] [-6.245] [-6.266] [-6.243] 
Change in Sale to total assets + 1.177*** 1.107"* 1.156"* 1.104"* 
[3.445] [3.267] [3.397] [3.260] 
Book Leverage (DAT) - -0.009"* -0.008*** -0.009*" -0.008"* 
[-7.179] [-7.047] [-7.100] [-7.022] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4092 0.4187 0.4103 0.4184 
***, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.5B: CEO overconfidence, firm innovation, and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Tobin's Q. Fixed effects models 
This table shows the results from fix two regression using Total citation count as 
dependent variable and GJndex'OverCEO; LowGJndex*OverCEO; and 
HighG_lndex*OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. OverCEO is an indicator 
variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years after the CEO holds 
options that are at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*GJndex; OverCEO*GJndex is 
interaction of two categorized variables between an indicator variable of OverCEO and 
the interacted variable of GJndex. Low(High)GJndex*OverCEO are interaction 
variables in which the natural logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 
3rd quintitle). CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, 
Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is 
percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is 
return on assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All 
COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are 
included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the 
period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 1,771 observations. 
Expected 
VarName signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept +  o r - 4.562"* 4.508*" 4.107*" 4.375*** 
[11.446] [11.257] [11.857] [10.999] 
OverCeo + 0.150"* 0.147*** 0.129*** 0.150*** 
[7.284] [7.149] [7.227] [7.373] 
Innovation + 0.014* 0.017" 0.015" 0.019" 
[1.807] [2.249] [2.314] [2.516] 
OverCEOJnnovation + 0.050* -0.012" -0.010" -0.012" 
[1.929] [-2.036] [-2.107] [-2.056] 
OverCEOJnnovation_Gindex - -0.029" 
[-2.441] 








CEOShareOwned + 0.019"* 0.019*** 0.015"* 0.017"* 
[4.115] [4.116] [3.572] [3.540] 
CEOAge - -0.257*** -0.252*** -0.188*** -0.234*** 
[-3.554] [-3.476] [-3.004] [-3.257] 
Competition + 0.434"* 0.443*** 0.283*** 0.400*" 
[4.629] [4.716] [3.465] [4.281] 
Size - -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.297*** -0.341*** 
[-14.438] [-14.391] [-14.355] [-14.323] 
Change in Sale to total assets + 0.052 0.084 0.047 0.073 
[0.314] [0.505] [0.328] [0.443] 
Book Leverage (DAT) - -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
[-1.361] [-1.410] [0.756] [-1.388] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8676 0.8672 0.8360 0.8697 
Observations 326x9  326x9  326x9  326x9  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.6A. CEO overconfidence, firm innovation and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is ROA. (Pooled OLS regressions) 
This table shows the results from pooled OLS regressions using Total citation count as 
dependent variable and Innovation which is measured by logarithm transformation of 
TotalCitation; GJndex'OverCEO; LowGJndex*OverCEO; and 
HighGJndex*OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. Dependent variable is Lead 
ROA which is Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by Total Assets. OverCEO is 
an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years after the 
CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*G_lndex; 
OverCEO*G_lndex is interaction of two categorized variables between an indicator 
variable of OverCEO and the interacted variable of GJndex. 
Low(High)GJndex*OverCEO are interaction variables in which the natural logarithm of 
GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). CEO_shares_ownership is 
stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total 
assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding 
common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on assets. Book leverage is total debt to 
book value of total assets. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 
100 million dollars are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms 
(SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 1,771 
observations. 
Expected 
Variable signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept + or - 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
[8.943] [8.635] [8.780] [8.601] 
OverCeo +  or - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
[-1.312] [-1.551] [-1.792] [-1.762] 
Innovation + 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0002** 0.0004** 
[3.080] [2.555] [2.328] [2.459] 






OverCEO_lnnovation_Gindex - -0.005*** 
[-3.567] 








Competition + 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
[5.459] [5.434] [5.459] [5.451] 
Size +  or - -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
[-8.706] [-8.655] [-8.649] [-8.694] 
SaleToAssets + 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
[1.676] [1.738] [1.814] [1.826] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2873 0.2872 0.2932 0.2932 
Observations 1711 1711 1711 1711 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.6B. CEO overconfidence, firm innovation, and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Lead ROA. (fixed effects models) 
This table shows the results from fixed effects models (fix two) using Lead ROA as 
dependent variable and Innovation which is measured by logarithm transformation of 
TotalCitation; OverCEO*lnnovation*G_lndex; OverCEO*lnnovation*HighGJndex; 
and OverCEO'lnnovation'LowGJndex as the key explanatory variables. Dependent 
variable is Lead ROA which is Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by Total 
Assets. OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for 
all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. 
OverCEO*G_lndex; OverCEO'GJndex is interaction of two categorized variables 
between an indicator variable of OverCEO and the interacted variable of GJndex. 
OverCEO*lnnovation*Low(High)GJndex are interaction variables in which the natural 
logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). 
CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, Execucomp. 
Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of 
common stocks to total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on 
assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All COMPUSTAT 
reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except 
regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1998 
through 2006. The sample included 326 cross sections and 9 time series. 
Expected 
Variable signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept + or - 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
[4.049] [4.011] [3.990] [4.100] 
OverCeo + or- <-0.001 <-0.001 <-0.001 <-0.001 
[0.291] [-0.115] [-0.022] [-0.052] 
LogT otalcitation + <-0.001 <-0.001* <-0.001 <-0.001* 
[-1.360] [-1.665] [-1.620] [-1.665] 






OverCEOJnnovationGindex - < -0.001 
[-0.312] 








Competition + 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
[3.629] [3.623] [3.366] [3.380] 
Size + or- -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
[-5.356] [-5.307] [-5.246] [-6.090] 
SaleTo Assets + 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
[1.056] [1.065] [0.970] [0.987] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8313 0.8317 0.8328 0.8328 
Observations 326x9 326x9 326x9 326x9 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.7A. CEO overconfidence, firm innovation, and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Lead Sales growth ( Pooled OLS regressions) 
This table shows the results from pooled OLS regressions using Total citation count as 
dependent variable and G_lndex*OverCEO; LowGJndex'OverCEO; and 
HighG_lndex*0verCE0 as the key explanatory variables. Dependent variable is Lead 
Sales growth which is a logarithm transformation of sales divided by the previous year 
value of sales minus one. OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which 
equals to one for all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-
money. OverCEO*G_lndex; OverCEO*G_lndex is interaction of two categorized 
variables between an indicator variable of OverCEO and the interacted variable of 
GJndex. Low(High)GJndex*OverCEO are interaction variables in which the natural 
logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). 
CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options. Size is natural 
logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to 
total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on assets. Book leverage 
is total debt to book value of total assets. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market 
value greater the 100 million dollars are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and 
financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 
1,771 observations. 
Expected 
Variable signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept + or- 0.048** 0.047** 0.047** 0.047** 
[2.506] [2.455] [2.457] [2.454] 
OverCeo + 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
[3.587] [3.575] [3.586] [3.586] 
Totalcitation + 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
[4.510] [4.517] [4.508] [4.511] 
OverCEOJnnovation + 0.012** -0.001*** -0.002** -0.002** 
[2.423] [-2.631] [-2.143] [-2.164] 
OverCEO Innovation Gindex -0.007*** 
[-2.617] 








DualTitle + or- -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
[-2.117] [-2.174] [-2.151] [-2.142] 
Competition + 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
[1.599] [1.579] [1.574] [1.574] 
Size + -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
[-3.664] [-3.653] [-3.647] [-3.648] 
FirmAge - -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
[-1.860] [-1.876] [-1.850] [-1.854] 
CEOAge - <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
[-0.029] [0.015] [0.013] [0.014] 
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Table 1.7A. (continued) 
Variable 
Expected 
signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 








Adjusted R-squared 0.0875 0.0874 0.0882 0.0878 
***, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.7B. CEO overconfidence, firm innovation, and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Lead Salesgrowth. (fixed effects models) 
This table shows the results from fixed effects models (fix two) using Lead Sales 
growth as dependent variable and GJndex'OverCEO; LowG_lndex*OverCEO; and 
HighGJndex'OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. Dependent variable is Lead 
Sales growth which is a logarithm transformation of sales divided by the previous year 
value of Sales minus one. 
OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years 
after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*G_lndex; 
OverCEO*G_lndex is interaction of two categorized variables between an indicator 
variable of OverCEO and the interacted variable of GJndex. 
Low(High)GJndex*OverCEO are interaction variables in which the natural logarithm of 
GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). CEO_shares_ownership is 
stock owned by the CEO, excluding options. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. 
Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding 
common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on assets. Book leverage is total debt to 
book value of total assets. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 
100 million dollars are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms 
(SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 326 cross 
sections and 9 time series. 
Expected 
VarName signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept + or- -94.873* -95.285* -95.842* -95.938* 
[-1.651] [-1.658] [-1.669] [-1.670] 
OverCeo + 8.247** 8.229** 8.370** 8.380** 
[2.185] [2.181] [2.218] [2.220] 
TotalCitation + 0.456 0.425 0.223 0.228 
[0.264] [0.246] [0.129] [0.131] 
OverCEOJnnovation + 6.689 -0.982 -4.979 -4.867 
[0.376] [-0.521] [-1.309] [-1.260] 










DualTitle + or - 2.122 2.093 2.306 2.347 
[0.495] [0.489] [0.539] [0.547] 
Competition - -86.725*** -86.538*** -88.272*** -88.115*** 
[-5.957] [-5.938] [-6.046] [-6.021] 
Size + 6.289 6.233 6.407 6.4 
[1.462] [1.450] [1.490] [1.488] 
FirmAge - -1.467 -1.499 -1.467 -1.493 
[-0.838] [-0.854] [-0.839] [-0.851] 
CEOAge - 5.311 5.509 5.344 5.376 
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Table 1.7B. (continued) 
Expected 
VarName signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
[0.474] [0.492] [0.477] [0.480] 
LogCAPX + 14.431*** 14.447*** 14.401*** 14.389*** 
[6.240] [6.250] [6.235] [6.224] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4311 0.4303 0.4302 0.4324 
Observations 3 2 6 x 9  3 2 6 x 9  3 2 6 x 9  3 2 6 x 9  
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Table 1.8A. Descriptive Statistics - Patent count models 
Variable N Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std Dev 
Patentcount 1711 4,340.00 1.00 80.57 13.00 269.16 
OverCeo 1711 1.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.47 
Firmage 1711 57.00 1.00 32.18 32.00 18.86 
CEOage 1711 89.00 35.00 55.84 56.00 7.24 
Size 1711 750,507.00 89.15 13,917.39 3,346.65 47,525.58 
CAPX 1711 33,143.00 0.63 663.13 139.90 2,307.61 
ROA 1711 48.15 (290.84) 5.26 5.94 11.42 
DAT 1711 144.04 0.00 23.10 22.77 16.61 
LJndex 1711 1.03 0.60 0.92 0.92 0.06 
Dual class 1711 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.25 
SOX 1711 1.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.48 
Tobinq 1711 27.09 0.81 2.52 1.88 1.99 
SALECHG 1711 418.82 (66.03) 11.22 8.46 25.57 
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Table 1.8B. Pearson Correlation and p-value - Patent count models 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 



















































Firmage 0.072 -0.157 0.167 0.131 -0.038 0.322 1.000 
0.003 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.117 <.0001 
CEOage -0.021 0.024 0.273 -0.077 -0.001 0.065 0.069 1.000 
0.381 0.321 <.0001 0.002 0.983 0.007 0.004 
CAPX 0.267 -0.023 0.047 -0.024 0.196 0.523 0.147 0.020 1.000 
<.0001 0.351 0.054 0.317 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.409 
ROA 0.000 0.184 0.075 -0.028 0.021 0.051 0.059 0.044 0.001 1.000 
0.996 <.0001 0.002 0.239 0.388 0.034 0.015 0.071 0.983 
DAT -0.007 -0.154 0.145 0.002 0.004 0.193 0.195 0.063 0.151 -0.251 1.00 
0.788 <.0001 <.0001 0.921 0.864 <.0001 <.0001 0.009 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 1.9A. Relation between firm innovation and CEO overconfidence (Pooled 
OLS regressions). Dependent variable is Patent Count and GJndex is the 
measure of corporate governance 
This table shows the results from pooled OLS regression using LogPatentcount as 
dependent variable and GJndex*OverCEO; LowGJndex*OverCEO; 
HighGJndex*OverCEO and SOX*OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. Dependent 
variable is firm innovation proxied by LogPatentcount which is now calculated by 
logarithm transformation of number of Patent grouped by "GVKEY" and "Year Patent 
applied for" in NBER Patent database files. OverCEO is an indicator variable of 
overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years after the CEO holds options that are 
at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO'GJndex and SOX*OverCEO all are interactions of 
two categorized variables between an indicator variable of OverCEO variable and the 
interacted variables. Low(High)GJndex*OverCEO are interaction variables in which the 
natural logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). 
CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, Execucomp. 
Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of 
common stocks to total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on 
assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All COMPUSTAT 
reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except 
regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1998 
through 2006. The sample included 1,711 observations. 
Expected 
Variable signs MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Intercept 0.357* 0.398** 0.322 0.427** 
[1.794] [2.001] [1.614] [2.149] 
OverCeo + 0.245*** 0.100*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 
[6.221] [6.770] [6.544] [6.646] 
GJndexOverceo - -0.015*** 
[-3.940] 
HighLogGJndexOverCEO - -0.046*** 
[-3.361] 
LowLogGJndexOverCEO + 0.064*** 
[4.485] 
GJndex - -0.009*** 
[-3.975] 
SoxOverceo - -0.117*** -0.120*** -0.117*** -0.118*** 
[-5.365] [-5.520] [-5.363] [-5.440] 
CEOShareOwned 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
[1.359] [1.365] [1.006] [1.192] 
Size 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 
[0.649] [0.711] [0.806] [0.770] 
SaleToAssets -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.060*** -0.059*** 
[-4.850] [-4.883] [-4.552] [-4.528] 
FirmAge 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 
[0.862] [0.853] [0.622] [0.936] 
CEOAge -0.124*** -0.131*** -0.121*** -0.123*** 
[-2.682] [-2.827] [-2.626] [-2.654] 
CAPX 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
[5.864] [5.740] [5.619] [5.666] 
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Table 1.9A. (continued) 
Variable 
Expected 
signs MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Book leverage (DAT) -0.110"* -0.106*** -0.102** -0.099** 
[-2.683] [-2.563] [-2.485] [-2.394] 
Competition 0.220** 0.230** 0.205** 0.225** 
[2.177] [2.278] [2.036] [2.231] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1626 0.1605 0.1648 0.1627 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.9B. Relation between firm innovation and CEO overconfidence (fixed 
effects models). Dependent variable is Patent Count and GJndex is the 
measure of corporate governance 
This table shows the results from fixed effects models (fix two) using LogPatentcount as 
dependent variable and GJndex*OverCEO; LowGJndex*OverCEO; 
HighGJndex*OverCEO and SOX*OverCEO as the key explanatory variables. Dependent 
variable is firm innovation proxied by LogPatentcount which is now calculated by 
logarithm transformation of number of Patent grouped by "GVKEY" and "Year Patent 
applied for" in NBER Patent database files. OverCEO is an indicator variable of 
overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years after the CEO holds options that are 
at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*GJndex; OverCEO*G_lndex; 
DualityTitle*OverCEO; Dualclass*OverCEO; SOX*OverCEO and 
CEOShareOwnership*OverCEO all are interactions of two categorized variables between 
an indicator variable of OverCEO variable and the interacted variables. Institutional share 
ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held 
by an institutional investor. CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, 
excluding options, Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share 
ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held 
by CEO. ROA is return on assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total 
assets. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars 
are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by 
the period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 324 cross sections x 9 time series. 
Expected 
VarName signs Model 1 Model2 Model3 ModeI4 
Intercept -0.920*** -0.960* ** -0.879*** -1.403*** 
[-2.988] [-3.098] [-2.842] [-4.356] 
OverCeo + 0.274*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 
[3.639] [4.064] [3.951] [4.485] 
LogG indexOverceo - -0.100*** 
[-2.975] 
HighLogG indexOverCEO - 0.024 
[0.940] 
LowLogGJndexOverCEO + 0.050** 
[2.191] 
LogG index - -0.230*** 
[-4.593] 
SoxOverceo - 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.008 
[0.707] [0.395] [0.419] [0.365] 
CEOShareOwned 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
[1.071] [1.158] [1.407] [1.324] 
Size 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.074*** 
[3.318] [3.388] [3.329] [3.159] 
SaleTo Assets 0.062* 0.063** 0.063** 0.062** 
[1.958] [1.968] [1.975] [1.984] 
FirmAge -0.019** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
[-2.553] [-2.663] [-2.670] [-2.773] 
CEOAge 0.040 0.040 0.031 0.027 
[0.730] [0.737] [0.576] [0.500] 
CAPX -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
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Table 1.9B. (continued) 
Expected 
VarName signs Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
[-0.596] [-0.489] [-0.414] [-0.379] 
Book leverage (DAT) 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.010 
[0.074] [-0.014] [-0.077] [-0.173] 
Competition -0.187** -0.172** -0.159** -0.151** 
[-2.495] [-2.288] [-2.106] [-2.018] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.7596 0.7581 0.7588 0.7617 
Observations 3 2 4 x 9  3 2 4 x 9  3 2 4 x 9  3 2 4 x 9  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.1 OA. CEO overconfidence, firm innovation and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Lead Tobin's Q. Tobin's q is market value divided by 
book assets (Villaloonga and Amit 2006). Pooled OLS regressions 
This table shows the results from pooled OLS regression with year dummies using 
Tobin's Q as dependent variable and OverCEO*Patentcount*G_lndex; 
verCEO*Patentcount*HighG_lndex; and OverCEO*Patentcount*LowG_lndex as the key 
explanatory variables. LogPatentcount is measured by logarithm transformation of 
number of Patent grouped by "GVKEY" and "Year Patent applied for" in NBER Patent 
database files. OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to 
one for all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. 
OverCEO*G_lndex; OverCEO*G_lndex is interaction of two categorized variables 
between an indicator variable of OverCEO and the interacted variable of GJndex. 
OverCEO*Patentcount*Low(High)G_lndex are interaction variables in which the natural 
logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). 
CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, Execucomp. 
Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of 
common stocks to total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on 
assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All COMPUSTAT 
reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except 
regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1998 
through 2006. The sample included 1,771 observations. 
Expected 
Variable signs MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Intercept 1.101"* 1.147*" 1.093"* 1.102*** 
[8.696] [6.959] [8.625] [8.670] 
OverCeo + 0.119"* 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.100" 
[3.006] [9.551] [9.430] [2.507] 
Patentcount + 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.046*** 
[6.434] [8.832] [8.814] [6.097] 
OverCEO_patentcount_Gindex +  or - 0.018"* 
[3.222] 
OverCEO_patentcount_HighGindex +  or - -0.135*" 
[-6.429] 
OverCEO_patentcount_LowGindex +  or - 0.100*" 
[3.725] 
OverCEO_patentcount + 0.046"* 
[3.704] 
Size -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.059*** 
[-3.318] [-3.402] [-3.440] [-3.332] 
CAPX -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 
[-0.716] [-0.686] [-0.564] [-0.691] 
ROA 0.007" 0.008" 0.008" 0.007" 
[2.035] [2.097] [2.046] [2.035] 
Book leverage (DAT) -0.008*" -0.008*** -0.008*" -0.008*" 
[-5.511] [-5.191] [-5.186] [-5.481] 
Competition -0.391"* -0.354"* -0.396"* -0.384"* 
[-2.880] [-2.588] [-2.930] [-2.844] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3333 0.344 0.3366 0.3345 
... .* and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.1 OB. CEO overconfidence, firm innovation, and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Lead Tobin's Q. Tobin's q is market value divided by 
book assets (Villaloonga and Amit 2006). Fixed effects models 
This table shows the results from fixed effects models (fix two) using Tobin's Q as 
dependent variable and OverCEO*Patentcount*GJndex; 
OverCEO*Patentcount*HighGJndex; and OverCEO*Patentcount*LowGJndex as the 
key explanatory variables. LogPatentcount is measured by logarithm transformation of 
number of Patent grouped by "GVKEY" and "Year Patent applied for" in NBER Patent 
database files. OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to 
one for all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. 
OverCEO*G_lndex; OverCEO*GJndex is interaction of two categorized variables 
between an indicator variable of OverCEO and the interacted variable of GJndex. 
OverCEO*Patentcount*Low(High)GJndex are interaction variables in which the natural 
logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). 
CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, Execucomp. 
Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of 
common stocks to total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on 
assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All COMPUSTAT 
reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except 
regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1998 
through 2006. The sample included 324 cross sections and 9 time series. 
Expected 
VarName signs Moded Model2 Model3 Model4 
Intercept 3.227"* 3.190*** 3.163*** 3.191*** 
[11.876] [11.711] [11.760] [11.619] 
OverCeo + 0.074" 0.071" 0.072" 0.066" 
[2.444] [2.353] [2.441] [2.178] 
Patentcount + 0.051* 0.017" 0.017" 0.018" 
[1.933] [2.058] [2.095] [2.186] 
OverCEO_patentcount_Gindex +  or - -0.016 
[-1.365] 
OverCEO_patentcount_HighGindex +  or - 0.050 
[1.447] 
OverCEO_patentcount_LowGindex +  or - 0.164*" 
[5.491] 
OverCEO_patentcount + -0.008 
[-0.715] 
Size -0.340*** -0 342"* -0.331*** -0.338*** 
[-12.493] [-12.528] [-12.268] [-12.354] 
CAPX 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.017 
[1.079] [1.132] [0.978] [1.168] 
ROA 0.003"* 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*" 
[3.689] [3.675] [3.871] [3.676] 
Book leverage (DAT) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
[-1.201] [-1.255] [-1.125] [-1.211] 
Competition 0.301*" 0.310*" 0.252" 0.303"* 
[2.925] [3.016] [2.474] [2.943] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8662 0.8662 0.869 0.866 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.11 A. CEO overconfidence, firm innovation, and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Lead ROA. Pooled OLS regressions 
This table shows the results from pooled OLS regression with year dummies using Lead 
ROA as dependent variable and LogPatentCount; OverCEO*Patentcount*GJndex; 
OverCEO*Patentcount*HighGJndex; and OverCEO*Patentcount*LowG_lndex as the 
key explanatory variables. Dependent variable is Lead ROA which is Income Before 
Extraordinary Items divided by Total Assets. LogPatentcount is measured by logarithm 
transformation of number of Patent grouped by "GVKEY" and "Year Patent applied for" in 
NBER Patent database files. OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO 
which equals to one for all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-
money. OverC EO*GJ ndex; OverCEO*G_lndex is interaction of two categorized 
variables between an indicator variable of OverCEO and the interacted variable of 
GJndex. OverCEO*Patentcount*Low(High)GJndex are interaction variables in which 
the natural logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). 
CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, Execucomp. 
Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of 
common stocks to total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on 
assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All COMPUSTAT 
reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except 
regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1998 
through 2006. The sample included 1,771 observations. 
Expected 
Variable signs MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Intercept 0.060*" 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.060*" 
[8.015] [7.733] [7.880] [8.024] 
OverCeo + 0.005*" 0.002 0.002 0.004*** 
[2.813] [1.618] [1.475] [2.656] 
Log_Patentcount + <0.001* < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
[1.738] [0.307] [0.084] [1.576] 
OverCEOJogpatentcount_Gindex -<0.001 "* 
[-2.793] 
OverCEO_patentcount_HighGindex - -0.002" 
[-2.458] 
OverCEO_patentcount_LowGindex + 0.005*** 
[4.630] 
OverCEOJogpatentcount + -0.001" 
[-2.411] 
Size -0.007"* -0.007*** -0.007"* -0.007*** 
[-8.152] [-8.069] [-8.099] [-8.145] 
SaleToAssets -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
[-1.010] [-0.981] [-0.694] [-1.025] 
CAPX 0.002* 0.001* 0.001* 0.002* 
[1.779] [1.698] [1.706] [1.763] 
Competition -0.013*" -0.013"* -0.015*** -0.014"* 
[-3.175] [-3.065] [-3.375] [-3.188] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1698 0.1697 0.1776 0.1693 
***, ", and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.11B. CEO overconfidence and Firm Performance. Dependent variable 
is Lead ROA. Fixed effects models 
This table shows the results from fixed effects models using Lead ROA as dependent 
variable and LogPatentCount; OverCEO*Patentcount*GJndex; 
OverCEO*Patentcount*HighG_lndex; and OverCEO*Patentcount*LowGJndex as the 
key explanatory variables. Dependent variable is Lead ROA which is Income Before 
Extraordinary Items divided by Total Assets. OverCEO is an indicator variable of 
overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years after the CEO holds options that are 
at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*GJndex; OverCEO*G_lndex is interaction of two 
categorized variables between an indicator variable of OverCEO and the interacted 
variable of GJndex. OverCEO*Patentcount*Low(High)GJndex are interaction variables 
in which the natural logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile (greater than 3rd 
quintitle). CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, 
Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is 
percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is 
return on assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All 
COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are 
included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the 
period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 326 cross sections and 9 time series. 
Expected 
VarName signs Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Intercept 31.274*" 31.006"* 31.218*" 31.315*** 
[3.268] [3.238] [3.278] [3.273] 
OverCeo + 0.920 1.201" 1.237"* 0.951 
[1.008] [2.570] [2.655] [1.037] 
Log_Patentcount + -0.486 -0.461 -0.423 -0.483 
[-1.500] [-1.458] [-1.343] [-1.490] 




OverCEO_patentcount_LowGindex + 2.741*" 
[2.998] 
OverCEOJ-ogpatentcount + 0.075 
[0.301] 
Size -4.008*" -4.057"* -3.939*** -4.012*" 
[-4.297] [-4.348] [-4.240] [-4.303] 
SaleToAssets 8.094*** 8.115*** 7.978*** 8.095"* 
[6.588] [6.606] [6.513] [6.588] 
CAPX -2.130*** -2.145"* -2.182*** -2.133*** 
[-4.624] [-4.671] [-4.764] [-4.635] 
Competition 15.350*" 15.357*** 14.579*" 15.336*** 
[5.252] [5.258] [4.992] [5.249] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5965 0.5966 0.5992 0.5965 
Observations 326x9  326x9  326x9  326x9  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.12A: CEO overconfidence, firm innovation, and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Lead SalesGrowth. Pooled OLS regressions 
This table shows the results from pooled OLS regressions using Lead SaleGrowth as 
dependent variable and LogPatentCount; OverCEO*Patentcount*GJndex; 
OverCEO*Patentcount*HighGJndex; and OverCEO*Patentcount*LowG_lndex as the 
key explanatory variables. Dependent variable is Lead Sales growth which is a logarithm 
transformation of sales divided by the previous year value of Sales minus one. 
LogPatentcount is measured by logarithm transformation of number of Patent grouped by 
"GVKEY" and "Year Patent applied for" in NBER Patent database files. OverCEO is an 
indicator variable of overconfident CEO which equals to one for all years after the CEO 
holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. OverCEO*G_lndex; OverCEO*GJndex 
is interaction of two categorized variables between an indicator variable of OverCEO and 
the interacted variable of GJndex. OverCEO*Patentcount*Low(High)GJndex are 
interaction variables in which the natural logarithm of GJndex is less than 1st quintile 
(greater than 3rd quintitle). CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, 
excluding options, Execucomp. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share 
ownership (%) is percentage of common stocks to total outstanding common shares held 
by CEO. ROA is return on assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total 
assets. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars 
are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by 
the period 1998 through 2006. The sample included 1,771 observations. 
Expected 
Variable signs MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Intercept 1.526"* 1.516*** 1.559*** 1.186"* 
[11.205] [10.171] [11.530] [7.249] 
OverCeo + 0.046* 0.041* 0.042* 0.043* 
[1.908] [1.721] [1.783] [1.812] 
OverCEO_patentco u nt + 0.599" -0.081 -0.075 -0.075 





OverCEO_patentcount_LowGindex + -0.090*** 
[-3.364] 
LogPatentCount + 0.160*** 
[4.620] 
CEOShareOwned 0.010* 0.010" 0.012" 0.012" 
[1.876] [2.027] [2.260] [2.337] 
Size 0.778*" 0.776*** 0.778*** 0.776"* 
[35.120] [35.294] [35.676] [35.737] 
CAPX 0.173*** 0.172*" 0171* * *  0.172"* 
[8.645] [8.676] [8.653] [8.725] 
Competition 3.320*** 3.307*** 3.332"* 3.293*** 
[15.519] [15.323] [15.664] [15.399] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9081 0.9084 0.9086 0.9091 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.12B: CEO overconfidence, firm innovation, and firm performance. 
Dependent variable is Lead SalesGrowth. Fixed effects models. 
This table shows the results from fixed effects models (fix two) using Lead SaleGrowth 
as dependent variable and LogPatentCount; OverCEO*Patentcount*GJndex; 
OverCEO*Patentcount*HighGJndex; and OverCEO*Patentcount*LowGJndex as the 
key explanatory variables. Dependent variable is Lead Sales growth which is a logarithm 
transformation of sales divided by the previous year value of Sales minus one. 
LogPatentcount is measured by logarithm transformation of number of Patent in NBER 
Patent database files. OverCEO is an indicator variable of overconfident CEO which 
equals to one for all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-
money. OverCEO*GJndex; OverCEO*GJndex is interaction of two categorized 
variables between an indicator variable of OverCEO and the interacted variable of 
GJndex. OverCEO*Patentcount*Low(High)GJndex are interaction variables in which 
the natural logarithm of GJndex is less than 1s1 quintile (greater than 3rd quintitle). 
CEO_shares_ownership is stock owned by the CEO, excluding options, Execucomp. 
Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Insider share ownership (%) is percentage of 
common stocks to total outstanding common shares held by CEO. ROA is return on 
assets. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. All COMPUSTAT 
reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except 
regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1998 
through 2006. The sample included 326 cross sections and 9 time series. 
Expected 
VarName signs ModeH Model2 Model3 Model4 
Intercept 4.671"* 4.675*** 4.616*** 4.717"* 
[20.591] [20.560] [20.495] [20.648] 
OverCeo + 0.042*" 0.046*" 0.048*" 0.044*** 
[2.996] [3.446] [3.653] [3.334] 
OverCEO_patentcount + -0.215 0.053" 0.058" 0.050* 
[-0.705] [2.009] [2.245] [1.912] 
OverCEO_patentcount_Gindex ~ 0.145 
[0.881] 
OverCEO_patentcount_HighGindex ~ -0.003 
[-0.094] 
OverCEO_patentcount_LowGindex + 0.121"* 
[4.826] 
Log_patentcount + 0.013 
[1.529] 
CEOShareOwned 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 
[0.685] [0.677] [0.163] [0.664] 
Size 0.407*" 0.407"* 0.413*" 0.405*** 
[18.511] [18.451] [18.900] [18.378] 
CAPX 0.028" 0.028" 0.026" 0.027" 
[2.279] [2.256] [2.102] [2.228] 
Competition 0.666*** 0.663*" 0.631*" 0.670"* 
[8.524] [8.485] [8.123] [8.572] 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9899 0.9899 0.9901 0.9899 
Observations 326x9  326x9  326x9  326x9  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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ESSAY 2 
BOOK-TAX INCOME DIFFERENCES: A NEW MEASURE OF EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate income is calculated twice each year for two external reporting 
purposes. The first is for reporting firm performance to stakeholders under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the second is for 
determining tax obligations according to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The 
use of two different sets of accounting rules in preparing financial statements and 
tax returns has led to differences between book income and taxable income. The 
U.S. Department of the Treasury reported in 1999 that book-tax differences (BTD) 
had increased significantly throughout the 1990s. Recent studies confirm that the 
divergence between book income and taxable income continues to be a common 
phenomenon in the corporate sector (Yin 2003; Hanlon 2005; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2009; Atwood, Drake and Myers 2010). 
Book-tax differences can arise due to different requirements for the timing 
of recognition of income and expense items under different rules. GAAP allows 
managers discretion in their choice of accounting procedures for the purpose of 
making accounting information more informative. Tax regulations, however, are 
less flexible and deferred revenue does not exist under the IRC. On the other 
hand, recent academic literature suggests that book-tax differences are likely 
related to other reasons. First, some researchers suggest that book-tax 
differences exist as a result of earnings management. Joos et al. (2000) find 
evidence that the correlation between earnings and stock return weakens when 
book-tax differences are large; they argue that investors consider large book-tax 
differences indicative of opportunistic firm behavior and thus respond less to 
earnings. Phillips et al. (2003) find that deferred tax expense provides information 
about earnings management activities. Lev and Nissim (2004) observe that book-
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tax differences are related to subsequent earnings growth and are thus correlated 
with earnings management. Palepu et al. (2005) suggests that abnormal book-tax 
differences indicate worsening earnings quality. Second, it has been argued that 
book-tax differences exist as firms use tax-planning strategies to defer taxes to 
reduce the present value of the taxes paid. Desai and Dharmapala (2009) develop 
a model in which opportunistic managers act as residual claimants on corporate 
cash flows and have incentives to avoid tax payments. 
Despite the frequently alleged relation between book-tax differences and 
earnings management, few attempts have been made to develop a measure of 
earnings management based on the characteristics of book-tax differences. To fill 
this void, I develop a simple model that measures earnings management directly 
from book-tax differences. In addition, I am also motivated to make this 
investigation due to the concern of the adequacy of conventional measures of 
earnings management. Researchers have typically relied on accounting accruals 
as a measure of earnings management. In a survey of the literature on earnings 
management, Dechow et al. (2010) find considerable conflicts among reported 
results when earnings management is measured by accruals. 
The earnings management measure I develop in this study is a 
comprehensive measure that captures taxable income related earnings 
management in addition to the conventional book income related accruals 
management. To confirm the adequacy of the new measure of earnings 
management developed in this study, I revisit several earnings management 
related issues previously investigated in the literature to see if the new measure 
performs better than conventional measures. The issues I re-examine include: 
1. Executive stock option exercises - Insiders have incentives to use private 
information about forthcoming earnings to time their stock option exercises. 
Conflicting results have been documented by Bartov (2004), Efendi (2007) and 
Armstrong et al. (2009). My new measure that captures both income tax 
related and book income related earnings management may provide better 
insights. 
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2. Firm credit ratings - Earnings management has led to downward revisions of 
firm credit ratings because credit analysts are able to see through the 
information content of earnings management (Ayers et al. 2009). The book-tax 
earnings management measure I develop can provide additional information to 
credit analysts. 
3. Firm Value and earnings management - Outside investors are in general 
unable to fully comprehend the information underlying earnings management. 
The new book-tax earnings management measure I develop may help 
investors respond more correctly as the measure incorporates more 
information. 
The following is a brief preview of the results that I have found in this study. 
1. Executive stock option exercises are significantly affected by earnings 
management. My results show that taxable income related earnings 
management also plays a role in influencing executive stock option exercises. My 
results also show that executives time their stock option exercises regardless of 
the source of earnings management. 
2. Rating agencies downgrade a firm's credit worthiness when there is evidence 
of earnings management. However, for firms that are considered high tax-
planning firms and have poor earnings quality, credit analysts can decipher 
additional information from taxable income despite firm performance is 
masked by poor earnings quality. My results show that credit analysts react 
favorably to tax savings associated with tax planning activity when other 
information is obscured by earnings management. 
3. My new measure of earnings management shows results consistent with the 
extant literature that outside investors are unable to comprehend the 
information underlying earnings management and they respond with a positive 
bias in the current year. My results also show that once investors decipher the 
information of earnings management, they correct their errors in the following 
time periods. 
My major contribution to the literature is the new approach of measuring 
earnings management from book-tax differences. The new measure reflects both 
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taxable income related earnings management and the typical book income 
accruals earnings management. As a result, the measure is more powerful in 
explaining firm behaviors that are not documented previously. Moreover, given the 
inconsistent results in existing literature when earnings management is measured 
by accruals, my new measure of earnings management may help resolve 
unexplainable conflicting results previously reported. My study adds to the strand 
of literature on the measurement of earnings management. Facing constantly 
changing accounting rules and tax regulations, firms have adeptly revised their 
methods of earnings management regularly. My investigation opens a new 
channel to understanding corporate earnings management and shows the 
importance to have a comprehensive view of earnings management than the 
conventional focus on book income accruals management alone. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1 Book-Tax Differences 
Tax and financial reporting rules allow for differences in the timing of revenue 
and expense recognition. For example, for tax purposes, depreciation is generally 
calculated using an accelerated method so that in the early years of an asset's life, 
taxable income is lower than income for financial reporting purposes. The benefit of 
using accelerated depreciation for tax purposes is equal to the present value of the 
accelerated deductions versus those that would result from the use of straight line 
depreciation. A difference between book income and taxable income can also arise 
when revenue or expense is recognized under one system but not the other. For 
example, interest on municipal bonds and a portion of dividends received from other 
corporations generally are excluded from the calculation of a corporation's taxable 
income, but considered income for financial reporting purposes. Book-tax differences 
can also arise for firms involved in foreign trade when the firms reduce tax 
obligations through transfer pricing or cross-border dividend capture. These types of 
foreign activity related book-tax differences are permanent in nature and do not give 
rise to deferred tax assets or liabilities and related expenses. 
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Aside from the differences between GAAP and IRC, a book-tax gap exists 
when either book income is raised by earnings management and/or taxable income 
is reduced by tax sheltering (planning) activity. Despite it is conventionally believed 
that tax sheltering activity can reduce tax obligations and benefit shareholders, the 
evidence in academic literature suggests a different picture. Several researchers find 
that investors react negatively to disclosure of tax sheltering activity by corporations 
(Desai and Hines 2002; Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew 2004; Hanlon and Slemrod 
2008). Desai and Dharmapala (2009) argue that when corporate governance is 
weak, opportunistic managers may have incentives to avoid tax obligations even if 
the activity is costly to the firm. 
A major debate on the issue of book-tax differences focuses on the 
desirability of book-tax conformity. Those who support tightening discretion in 
financial reporting argue that higher book-tax conformity (smaller book-tax 
differences) will increase tax compliance and reduce abusive tax sheltering and 
opportunistic financial reporting, and thus improve earnings quality (Desai 2005, 
Whitaker 2006; Desai and Dharmapala 2009). However, opponents of higher book-
tax conformity have reported considerable empirical evidence that higher book-tax 
conformity reduces earnings quality. For example, Hanlon, Maydew and Shevlin 
(2008) report that increased conformity results in less informative earnings. Atwood 
et al. (2010) find that earnings have lower persistence and a lower correlation with 
future cash flows when conformity is higher. For now, the debate on book-tax 
conformity is continuing and the result inconclusive. 
2.2.2. Earnings Management 
Prior research finds that investors do not fully comprehend the lower 
persistence of the accruals component of earnings; thus stock price movements can 
be influenced by accruals management (Richardson et al. 2005; Hanlon 2005). 
Sloan (1996) also finds that investors do not react correctly to earnings accruals 
information instantaneously. The extant literature has also shown that earnings 
management is prevalent in the business sector. Earnings management has been 
related to corporate events such as acquisitions (Erickson and Wang 1997; Louis 
2004), seasoned equity offerings (Jo, Kim and Park 2007; Lee and Masulis 2009), 
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initial public offerings of equity securities (Teoh et al. 1998; Toeh and Wong 2002), 
share buybacks (Gong, Louis and Sun 2008), management buyouts (Wu 1997; 
Hafzalla 2009), the exercise of executive stock options (Bergstresser and Phillpon 
2006), among others. 
Earnings management typically involves the inflation of book income and 
results in book-tax differences. Joos et al. (2000) find evidence that the correlation 
between earnings and stock return weakens when book-tax differences are large; 
they argue that investors consider large book-tax differences indicative of 
opportunistic firm behavior and respond less to earnings. Phillips et al. (2003) argue 
that, because tax laws permit less discretion than GAAP in accounting choices, large 
positive book-tax differences are indicative of earnings management. They find 
evidence that deferred tax expense is useful in detecting earnings management. Lev 
and Nissim (2004) find that book-tax differences predict subsequent earnings 
growth. Palepu et al. (2005) suggest that an abnormal book-tax difference indicates 
worsening earnings quality. In sum, accounting earnings are of lower quality when 
book-tax differences are large. 
Researchers in general look for the presence of earnings management by 
studying earnings quality of the firm. A number of researchers have focused on the 
association between earnings and stock returns in evaluating earnings quality 
(Francis and Schipper, 1999; Ecker et al., 2006, Wang 2006). This approach 
extracts information about earnings from stock prices by assuming the market is 
efficient. However, for directly measuring earnings management, the general 
approach is based on deducing earnings quality from accounting information. The 
measures based on this approach are typically related to the level of accruals 
(Sloan, 1996); the estimation error in accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002); and 
accruals volatility (Francis et al., 2005). Despite accruals are predominantly used in 
studies of earnings management, conflicting empirical results have been reported in 
the literature (Dechow et al. 2010). Thus, some have argued that book-tax 
differences may serve as an indicator of earnings management given the 
documented correlation between book-tax differences and earnings quality (Lev and 
Nissim 2004; Hanlon 2005; Palepu et al. 2005; Ayers 2009). To infer earnings 
management from book-tax differences, Lev and Nissim (2004) study the disparity 
76 
between temporary and permanent differences whereas Schallheim and Wells 
(2007) compare current tax spread and total tax spread. Ayers et al. (2007) 
investigate the difference between high tax-planning and low tax-planning firms 
whereas Poterba et al. (2008) analyze tax footnote disclosures. 
Despite the frequently alleged relation between book-tax differences and 
earnings management, few attempts have been made to develop a measure of 
earnings management based on the characteristics of book-tax differences. To fill 
this void, I develop a simple model that measures earnings management directly 
from book-tax differences. 
2.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The sample period used in my study is between 1999 and 2010. My initial 
sample begins with Compustat firms that have a book value of assets over 100 
million dollars. In addition to excluding American Depository Receipts, regulated 
firms with SICs between 4900 and 4999 and financial firms with SICs between 6000 
and 6999 are also excluded. This initial sample consists of more than 5,196 US firms 
and 62,341 firm years. Based on the availability of executive stock option data and 
information on firm credit ratings, I eliminate firm-year observations that do not have 
the information needed for my analysis. The final sample has 5,014 firm-year 
observations from 2005 to 2010 for my investigation of executive stock option 
exercises; 4,866 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2010 for the re-examination of 
firm credit ratings, and 3,486 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2010 for the re­
examination of the impact of earnings management on firm value. 
***lnsert Tables 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b and 3c about here*** 
Table 1a provides a list of the 20 firms with the highest book-tax income 
differences over the 1999 to 2010 time period. The 20 firms are large reputable firms 
in the market. The size of the average book-tax difference is quite significant. For 
example, General Motors have an average book-tax difference of more than $1.9 
billion dollars and International Business Machines (IBM) has an average of about 
$1.6 billion. Entergy Corporation has an average book-tax difference of about $350 
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million, which is the smallest amount the 20 firms. The considerable size of book-tax 
differences, as shown in the table, suggests the importance of understanding their 
underlying information contents. Table 1b shows the top 20 firms with the largest 
standard deviation of book-tax income differences per year over the 1999 and 2010 
period. Table 2 reports the sample selection criteria and descriptive statistics of key 
variables of the sample. Table 3 reports correlation coefficients among the key 
variables. 
2.4 METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1. Measuring Book - Tax differences 
Following Manzon and Plesko (2002), I use total book-tax differences instead 
of current book-tax differences to study earning management. Total book tax 
difference is defined as the difference between a firm's income for financial reporting 
purposes and the firm's taxable income: 
Total Tax book difference = Total book income - Taxable income 
Where: 
Total book income = pre-tax book income (Compustat item # 170) - minority 
interest (Compustat item # 49) 
Taxable income = 
[Federal tax expense (data 63) + foreign tax expense (data 64)] 
•I.M.I.M.I. I.II.I —M.I.M.I.I.I.MM.I. II.I.II.I. .I.MM.I.II. .Ill • I . I I.I I I I JjI N Q| IA 
U. S. statutory tax 
• dNOLA is change in net operating loss carryforward, (Compustat item # 52). 
• If federal or foreign tax expense is missing: 
Tax expense = Total income tax expense (Compustat item # 16) -
deferred income tax expense (Compustat item # 50). 
Manzo and Plesko (2002); Schallheima and Wells (2006) identify four groups 
of factors that are likely to have a significant impact on the size of book-tax 
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differences. These factors are to be used as control variables in my estimation 
models in this study. The factors include: 
1. Tax favored investing activity 
a. Profitability: Profitable firms can make efficient use of tax deductions and tax 
credits and benefit from tax exemptions. As a result we can expect a positive 
relation between profitability and book-tax differences. In this study, pre-tax 
income to total assets is used as a proxy for profitability. 
b. Change in net sales: This is a key variable in the Manzon and Plesko (2002) 
model. Manzon and Plesko use the variable to proxy for firm growth. They 
find a positive relation between firm growth and book-tax differences. 
Growing firms may make more significant investments in tax-favored assets 
that generate timing differences in the recognition of expenses for financial 
reporting and tax purposes. 
2. Timing differences 
Differences between financial reporting and tax regulations in the timing of 
recognizing incomes and expenses give rise to book-tax gaps. One of the major 
variables related to timing differences is Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E here 
after). The depreciable lives of PP&E are set by statute for tax purposes, but firms 
have discretion in choosing depreciation methods when computing book income. 
Thus, Manzon and Plesko (2002) expect the book-tax difference to increase with 
utilization of depreciable assets. They also expect the size of book-tax gap to 
increase with the amount of younger assets (measured as the ratio of net PP&E to 
gross property, plant, and equipment to total assets). Another item associated with 
timing differences is postretirement benefits accounts as these accounts frequently 
hold tax-deferred assets. 
3. Permanent differences. 
Permanent book-tax differences arise when revenue or expense is 
recognized under one system but not the other. Unlike deferred taxes, these 
permanent differences do not reverse. Permanent differences also arise in a year 
when items of income or loss by-pass the income statement. An example is the 
exercise of employee stock options. Employees tend to exercise stock options when 
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corporate taxable income is high, shifting corporate tax deductions to the years with 
higher tax rates. These direct tax benefits of options increase in the convexity of the 
tax function). Other examples of permanent differences include Capital Lease 
Obligation and Current Operating Lease Expense. 
4. Noise factors. 
Foreign Operations: if firms operate in foreign countries that have a lower tax 
rate on corporate income than United States, they have incentives to shift taxable 
earnings to those foreign countries. 
Size: Large firms may be able to more efficiently devise and execute 
investing plans to exploit tax-advantaged assets. 
2.4.2. Measuring Earnings Management from book-tax differences 
Book-tax differences arise when a firm manages its book income and/or 
pursues tax avoidance activity. So far there have been very few attempts to measure 
earnings management directly from book-tax differences. A major challenge is that 
tax returns are not reported to the public, making information pertinent to book-tax 
differences not observable to most researchers and investors. In addition, it is 
difficult to isolate the effect of book income earnings management when book-tax 
differences are likely related to both tax planning activity and accruals management. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) use simple regressions regressing book-tax 
differences on total accruals to quantify the degree to which earnings management is 
responsible for the gap between book income and taxable income; the authors 
consider the regression residual a measure of tax avoidance. 
My estimation of earnings management from box-tax differences is based on 
the premise that earnings management is more than just accruals management. 
Dechow et al. (2010) point out that conflicting results are found in the literature when 
earnings management is measured by changes in accruals. There is ample evidence 
in the literature that earnings management could be related to taxable income. For 
example, Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills (2004) and Cook, Huston and Omer (2008) 
find evidence that firms manage earnings by manipulating effective tax rates. 
Phillips, Pincus and Rego 2003) find deferred tax expenses provide useful 
80 
information beyond accruals in detecting earnings management. Erickson, Hanlon 
and Maydew (2004) document that some firms overstate financial accounting 
income on their tax returns even though they have to pay a penalty. Based on these 
findings, I therefore develop a comprehensive measure of earnings management 
that reflects both accruals management in financial reporting and taxable income 
related earnings manipulations. I call this comprehensive measure book-tax 
difference total earnings management (BTDTEM). I argue that BTDTEM is more 
powerful than conventional earnings management measures that focus on accruals 
management only. Specifically, BTDTEM can detect tax-related earning 
management even when there is insignificant book income accruals management. 
My procedure encompasses two stages. First, I decompose book-tax differences into 
explained and unexplained components. I use conventional factors discussed in the 
literature to explain fluctuations in book-tax differences. This first step allows me to 
quantify the extent to which book-tax differences can be explained by structural 
factors. Second, I interpret the unexplained residual as total earnings management 
attributable to other factors such as accruals management and tax sheltering activity 
(Manzo and Plesko 2002). Then I calculate the standard deviation of a firm's 
unexplained residuals across a five-year period, i.e., Ej;t through cjM and call the 
standard deviation of the residuals book-tax difference total earnings management 
(BTDTEM). The focus on the standard deviation of regression residuals is based on 
the argument that the level of unexplained residuals is not indicative of a firm's 
earning management because the residuals could remain consistently high or low for 
an extended period due to nondiscretionary factors, but the associated small or large 
standard deviation could inform us of a higher or lower earnings quality (Francis et 
al. 2005). In addition, Graham and Tucker (2006) and Wilson (2009) report that 
many tax shelters generate permanent book-tax differences, thus the standard 
deviation of unexplainable residuals in my estimation model is more likely related to 
temporary tax sheltering activity which is a more realistic indicator of tax-related 
earnings management. The standard deviation of unexplained residuals therefore 
provides a good measure reflecting discretionary total earnings management that 
fluctuates from time to time. 
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I follow Manzo and Plesko (2002 and Schallheima and Wells (2006) in 
selecting the explanatory variables of book-tax differences (see appendix for variable 
descriptions): 
Book-tax differences^ = ctj.t + PidSALE + p2dPRBA + p3dGDWL 
+ p4PPENT/PPEGT + pgPPEGT + p6PIFO + p7DCLO + p8NonGDWLINTAN 
+ Ei.« (1) 
where dSale is change in net sales, PPNET/PPEGT is net Plant, Property 
and Equipment to gross Plant, Property and Equipment, dPRBA is change in post-
retirement benefits funded, PIFO is foreign pretax income, DCLO is capitalized lease 
obligations, dGDWL is change in goodwill, and NonGDWLINTA is non-goodwill 
tangible assets. The standard deviation of the residuals, measuring book-tax total 
earnings management (BTDTEM), is used as an independent variable in the issues 
that I re-examine in this study. 
To confirm the adequacy of the book-tax total earnings management, I also 
estimate a conventional earnings management measure based on the accruals 
quality model of Francis et al. 2005 and use it as a benchmark to check my results. 
Accruals are estimated by the following firm-level time-series regression model as 
suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002): 
dWQ,t = c + <PiCFOit-i+ <f>2CFOiit+<p3CFOij+1 + <p4ASaleift+((>5PPEu + yiit 
(2) 
where dWC is defined as the change in working capital and is calculated as 
changes in account receivable plus changes in Inventory plus changes in tax 
payable and plus changes in other assets (Compustat item #302 +Compustat item 
#303+ Compustat item #304 +Compustat item #305 + Compustat item #307). CFO 
is cash flow from operations from the SFAS No. 95, Statement of Cash Flows, 
(Compustat item #308); and ASaleiit are the change in sales in year t (Compustat 
item #12) and PPEiit are the level of property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t 
(Compustat item #7), in Compustat. In the model, the error term is a measure of 
earnings quality. Accruals quality is the standard deviation of the error term over a 
rolling 5-year window. 
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***Insert Table 2.4 about here*** 
Table 4 reports the estimation of my measure of book-tax total earnings 
management (BTDTEM) as well as that of a conventional accruals measure 
(accruals quality of Francis et al. 2005) for comparison purpose. My estimation 
model (the book-tax total earnings management model) is reported as Model 1 in 
Table 4 whereas the accruals model is Model 2 in the table. Consistent with existing 
literature, all the coefficients of the structural factors in model 1 are significant. 
Similarly in all the variables are also significant in Model 2. The results show that the 
two models have good explanatory power. For each firm-year, I calculate the 
standard deviation of the residuals from year t~4 to year t in each model to estimate 
the respective earnings management measure. Each earnings management 
measure is then used as an independent variable in my re-investigation of insiders' 
stock option exercises; firm credit rating; and investors' reactions and firm value. 
Taxable income could be a source of information on firm performance if the 
firm has poor earnings quality (Ayers et al. 2009). As a result, I also sort the sample 
by the degree of tax planning into high tax-planning and low tax-planning firms when 
performing my analysis. Following Dyreng et al. (2008) I identify high tax planning 
firms as firms having accumulated effective tax rates (ETR) below the median of 
each year and low tax planning firms as firms having accumulated effective tax rates 
{ETR) above the median. The accumulated effective tax rates (ETR) is calculated as 
follows: 
ETR 
- Special Itemsim) 
The numerator, CTE, is current tax expense calculated as total tax expense 
(Compustat item #16) less deferred tax expense (Compustat item #50) summed 
over the five-year period from t-5 through t-1. The denominator is the difference 
between PI, pre-tax income, and Special Items accumulated over the five-year 
period from t-5 through t. If Special Items is missing, it is set equal to zero. 
2.4.3 The three revisited earnings management related issues 
a) Earnings Management and Executive stock option exercises 
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The existing literature has provided evidence that corporate insiders 
manipulate earnings accruals to obtain a better exercise price for their stock options. 
Baker (2008) reports that insiders manage earnings to lower the share price on the 
option grant date so that a lower exercise price could be selected. Aboody and 
Kasznik (2000) find that bad news tends to precede grant dates and good news 
tends to follow. Heron and Lie (2006) document that managers have the ability to 
manipulate the grant date around known share price history. However, there is 
conflicting evidence regarding the relation between earnings management and 
executive stock option exercises. For example, Bartov and Mohanram (2004) and 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find evidence that managers influence share price 
movements and time their stock option exercises accordingly. In sharp contrast, 
Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find no evidence that insiders use private 
information to time option exercises. Aboody, Hughes, Liu and Su (2008) also report 
only weak evidence that option exercises precede bad news. Armstrong, Jagolinzer, 
and Larcker (2010) find that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms 
where CEOs have higher levels of stock and option based compensation. In 
addition, Armstrong et al. (2010) also find conflicting results among ten recent 
studies on the relation between accounting manipulation and executive stock option 
holdings. 
Given the conflicting evidence on executive stock option exercises 
reported in existing literature when earnings management is measured by 
accruals, I re-examine the relation between earnings management and executive 
stock option exercises using the book-tax total earnings management measure 
developed in this study. Since earnings management can be achieved through tax 
avoidance (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004; Cook, Huston and Omer 2008), I 
posit that the book-tax total earnings management measure I developed from 
book-tax differences could be more powerful in detecting correlations between 
earnings management and executive stock option exercises. Specifically, the 
total book-tax earnings management measure can detect the influence the 
taxable income related earnings management may have on executive stock 
option exercises even when there is no book income earnings management. 
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For my investigation, I develop the following model based on that of Mc Cannally 
(2006): 
OPTEXDj.t = c + fiiBTDTEMit + fcHigh TaxPlanning*B TDTEMit + 
p3LowTaxPlanning*BTDTEMjj + fi4Optgrit + (34EPSu -t + p5ROAt + PeDVu + 
p7CAPXiit + faLSIZEit + (SgPTBjt + faoHigh TaxPlanningu + fin Industry 
Dummies + (312Year Dummies + (3a) 
OPTEXDiit = c + PiAbnormalAccrualSjit + foOptgnj + p4EPSjit -1 + PsROA.t + 
(S6DVij + (37CAPXit + PsLSIZEit + faPTBn + PnIndustry Dummies + (312Year 
Dummies + £j,t (3b) 
where OPTEXDi|t represents Insiders' option exercises. BTDTEM is the standard 
deviation of abnormal book-tax income differences obtained from equation (1) and 
AbnormalAccrualj.t is the standard deviation of earning accruals obtained from 
equation (2). Following Mc Cannally, option grants (OPTGR) is added as a second 
incentive variable to allow for the situation that insiders may face multiple option 
related incentives. Factors including profitability, leverage, dividends, market-to-book 
ratio, firm size and Z-Score are also controlled for because of the possible effect 
they may have on firm price and option compensation. Net operating loss to assets 
and surplus cash are suggested by Coles et al (2006). To capture earnings 
management, equation 3a uses book-tax total earnings management measure 
(BTDTEM) whereas equation 3b uses the conventional accruals earnings 
management measure. 
b) Book-tax differences, earnings management and firm credit ratings 
Credit rating agencies serve the dual functions of monitoring firm behavior 
and disseminating information in capital markets. Despite some researchers have 
voiced concerns about the quality of credit rating agencies' products because of the 
profit-making motives of rating agencies and the limited competition in the rating 
industry (Admati and Pfleiderer 1986; Lizzeri 1999; Hunt 2009 'Columbia Business 
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law Review'), other researchers find evidence that credit ratings provide effective 
monitoring functions over firm behavior (Bannier, Hirsch, and Wiemann 2012). 
It has been reported in the literature that book-tax differences provide 
significant information of corporate earnings quality to credit analysts (Lev and 
Nissim 2004; Hanlon 2005). I revisit this topic because I argue that the determination 
of the firm's credit rating is complicated by the information contained in book-tax 
differences. As shown by Ayers et al. (2009), taxable income has low information 
content for high tax-planning firms because tax planning obscures the actual firm 
performance. However, Ayers et al. also find that the taxable income of high tax-
planning firms is more informative if the firms are associated with poor earnings 
quality. For example, tax planning activity that results in increases in deferred tax 
liability might be an indication of deteriorating earnings quality. Based on the above, I 
hypothesize that credit analysts are likely to look for additional information contained 
in the book-tax differences of high (low) tax-planning firms. I posit that credit 
analysts are likely to react favorably to the tax savings associated with tax planning 
activity once the total information contained in book-tax differences is deciphered. I 
also predict that low tax-planning firms that have poor earnings quality are unlikely to 
provide extra information to credit analysts through the book-tax difference. In short, 
I opine that analysts react differently to tax sheltering and accruals management 
information between high and low tax-planning firms. To test whether creditor 
analysts are able to see through the information of book-tax differences, I use the 
following ordered probit regression models: 
Pr.(Credit ratings,,t) = c + faBTDTEMjt + /32HighTaxPlanning*BTDTEM + 
/33LowTaxPlanning*BTDTEM + /84LOSS,,f + /3 5dCFOiit + p6Std.(ROAtM)ift + 
fijINTCOVjt + PgBookLeveragejt + fa DSaleiit + PioSCashit + ftuMTBjt + 
j8f2HighTaxPlanning + fi13Year fixed effects + p14lndustryu + Hi.t (4a) 
Pr. (Credit ratingsiit) = c + fi-i AbnormalAccrua!sit + foLOSSu + fisdCFOu + 
(34Std.(ROAtM)it + felNTCOVjt + (S6BookLeverageit + PrdSaleu + foSCashjt + 
foYear fixed effects + Piolndustryiit + niit (4b) 
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Where: 
Credit ratingsiit is S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Rating obtained 
from Compustat. BTDTEM is book-tax total earnings management obtained from 
equation (1) an AbnormalAccrualj,t is the standard deviation of earning accruals 
obtained from equation (2). HighTaxPlanning*BTDTEMtt is an interaction variable 
that captures the combined effect of a high tax planning and high fluctuation in 
abnormal book tax differences. LOSS is a (01) dummy variable that has a value of 1 
if the firm operating EPS is negative and 0 otherwise. A negative sign is expected 
because a lower profit should have negative effects on a firm's creditworthiness. 
dCFO is the change in a firm's operating cash flow from year t-1 to year t. A positive 
sign is expected. STDROA is standard deviation of ROA from year t-1 to year t 
which is calculated using five years data from year t-4 to t. BLEV is book leverage 
measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. A positive sign is expected. 
INTCOV is interest coverage calculated as EBITDA divided by interest. A positive 
sign is expected. 
c) Book-tax differences, earnings management and firm values 
Prior research concludes that investors do not fully comprehend the 
implication of accruals management (Richardson et al. 2005; Hanlon 2005). Sloan 
(1996) find that investors do not respond instantaneously to the information of 
earnings accruals Therefore, firms can influence share price movements by 
managing earnings accruals. I argue that share price movements can also be 
influenced by tax-related earnings management based on the evidence reported 
by Heflin and Kross (2005) that book-tax differences are capable of explaining 
contemporaneous annual stock returns. I further argue that since the source of 
book-tax differences is highly complicated, it is difficult for most investors to see 
through all the information contained. Thus, I posit that investors are likely to have 
overoptimistic reactions to contemporaneous tax sheltering activity but would 
correct their overreactions in the following years once the earnings quality is found 
questionable. Therefore, I predict that book-tax total earnings management is 
positively associated with firm value in the current year but negatively associated 
with firm value in the subsequent year. 
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To test my hypothesis, the following time series cross-sectional regression model is 
used. 
Firm Value/,/ = c + PiBTDTEM^ + faBTDTEMu -1 + P3BTDTEM1J-2 + p4BTDTEMit -3 
+ p5Sizejj + PeROAjt + PjdSALEu + PaDividendCutjj + foBLEVu + /3 ioMLEViit 
+ PuCAPEXit + PvZscoreit + P13NOL.Au + iQuCashSurplusit + 
p15CashToAssetSiit + PmHighTaxPlanningit + p17Year fixed effects + 
jS 18lndustry + r\it (5a) 
Firm Valuer = c + faAbnormalAccrualsu + fcSizeu + fcROAit + p4dSALEiit + 
PsDividendCutjj + P eBLEVu + frMLEVjt + fieCAPEXjj + PgZscoreiit + 
p10NOLAjt + PuCashSurpluSjt + P^CashToAssetSu + P^Year fixed effects + 
Pulndustry + % (5b,) 
where Firm Value is change in market to book ratio from year t-1 to year t 
and is calculated as market value of total assets divided by book value of assets. 
BTDTEMj.t and its lags of one, two and three years are the standard deviation of 
the abnormal book-tax income differences in years t, t-1, t-2 and t-3, respectively. 
AbnormalAccrualsi t and its lags are the standard deviation of accruals quality in 
years t, t-1, t-2 and t-3, respectively. Based on the studies of Graham et al. (2005) 
and Coles et al. (2006), the control variables include firm size, profitability, sales, 
dividends, leverage, and capital expenditure. Firm size is the natural log of the 
book value of assets. A positive sign is expected. ROA is used to capture the 
firm's profitability. A positive sign is expected. dSALE is an one year grow in sale 
calculated as the natural logarithm of net sale from year t-1 to year t. Dividend is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a reduction in annual 
dividend, and zero otherwise. A negative sign is expected. BLEV is book 
leverage. A positive sign is expected. MLEV is market leverage computed as the 
ratio of debt to market value of total assets. A negative sign is expected. CAPEX 
is net capital expenditure normalized by total assets, capturing growth 
opportunities. A positive sign is expected. 
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2.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.5.1. Book-tax total earnings management and Executive stock option 
exercises 
In table 2.5, I report the result of the re-examination of the relation between 
executive stock option exercises and earnings management. The estimation results 
of equations 3a and 3b are presented. My focus in table 2.5 is to see if the book-tax 
total earnings management measure (BTDTEMJ or the conventional accruals 
management measure has a higher explanatory power of executive stock option 
exercises. A priori, I posit that BTDTEM is more accurate and powerful in predicting 
executive option exercises because of the additional information captured by 
taxable-income related earnings management. From the pooled OLS regression 
result of model 1, the coefficient on BTDTEM is positive and significant at the 10% 
level. Despite the level of significance is only moderate, the positive sign is 
expected. It confirms that there are higher levels of executive stock option exercises 
when earnings management is elevated. The result is consistent with the findings of 
Bartov and Mohanram (2004) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). A plausible 
explanation is that insiders do not rush to exercise their options quickly as it has 
been found by many researchers that investors do not fully comprehend 
instantaneously the implication of earnings management and that they frequently fail 
to react correctly (Sloan 1996; Hanlon 2005; Richardson et al. 2005). Thus insiders 
might be able to exercise their options immediately or wait a while to exercise 
following earnings management. The coefficients on the control variables are mostly 
significant and have the expected sign, with the exception of OPEPS. In the pooled 
OLS regression of model 2, I investigate the interaction between tax planning and 
book-tax total earnings management. The interaction variable 
HighTaxPlanning*BTDTEM indicates that the book-tax total earnings management 
(BTDTEM) is associated with higher levels of taxable income related earnings 
management. The interaction variable LowTaxPlanning*BTDTEM indicates that 
BTDTEM has lower levels of taxable-income related earnings management as the 
firm is a low tax-planner. As expected, the coefficient on HighTaxPlanning*BTDTEM 
is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that executives exercise their 
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options upon managing book income and/or taxable income. The coefficient on 
LowTaxPlanning*BTDTEM is also positive and significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that executives exercise their options upon managing book income and 
taxable income even though the amount of taxable income related earnings 
management might be relatively smaller. In short, executives exercise their options 
following earnings management regardless of the source of earnings management. 
The fixed effect model results of model 1 and model 2 are similar to the pooled OLS 
results. 
The result of the accruals model is presented in the last two columns of 
table 2.5. In the pooled OLS model, it is shown that the coefficient on abnormal 
accruals is positive and significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficient on 
abnormal accruals is insignificant in the fixed effect model. Moreover, results 
using accruals quality as the measure of earnings management in Table 2.5a 
show a negative coefficient that is significant at 1 percent. The negative coefficient 
is unexpected and contradictory to existing results in the literature. This 
inconsistency, however, confirms that survey result of Dechow et al. (2010) that 
earnings management measured by accruals could lead to inconsistent findings. 
The conflicting results of accruals in explaining executive stock options exercises 
confirms the importance of considering taxable income related earnings 
management in examining a firm's manipulation of earnings. 
***lnsert Tables 2.5 and 2.5a about here*** 
2.5.2. Book-tax total earnings management and firm credit ratings 
Table 2.6 presents the result of estimation equations (4a) and (4b). 
Ordered Probit regressions are performed to investigate the relation between 
earnings management and firm credit ratings. In model 1 of the book-tax earnings 
management model, the regression coefficient on BTDTEM is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. The result is consistent with the finding in existing 
literature that firm credit ratings are revised downward when there is evidence of 
earnings management (poor earnings quality). The coefficient on LOSS is 
negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that loss firms are more likely 
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associated with downgrades of credit ratings. The coefficient on STDROA is also 
negative and significant, confirming existing literature that volatile firm 
performance is associated with poorer credit ratings. Also consistent with existing 
literature, the coefficients of CFO, INTCOV, DSALE, SCASH_AT, and MTB are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. In model 2 of the book-tax earnings 
management model, the interaction variable HightaxPlanning*BTDTEM reflects 
the scenario in which the firm is a high-tax-planning firm that is associated with 
poor earnings quality. Seida (2003) and Ayers et al. (2009) show evidence that 
taxable income is informative for firms that have poor earnings quality. That is, 
outsiders look to taxable income for information when firm performance is masked 
by earnings management. In Table 2.6, the coefficient on 
HightaxPlanning*BTDTEM is positive and significant at the 1% level. The result is 
consistent with the implication that credit analysts look past earnings management 
and give favorable credit ratings reviews if there were savings associated with tax 
planning activity. Thus, BTDTEM provides more information for credit analysts 
when the measure reflects the activity of high-tax planning firms. The coefficient 
on LowTaxPlanning*BTDTEM is insignificant. The result implies that credit 
analysts could not glean useful information when firms with poor earnings quality 
do not pursue tax planning activity. The result is consistent with the findings of 
Seida (2003) and Ayers et al. (2009). In short, BTDTEM has good explanatory 
power of firm credit ratings once analysts take into consideration the information 
provided by tax planning activity. In the last column in table 2.6, the result of the 
abnormal accruals model is presented. The coefficient on abnormal accruals is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. The result is consistent with existing 
findings that earnings management is associated with lower firm credit ratings. 
Similar result is obtained in Table 2.6a where accruals quality is used instead of 
abnormal accruals. Comparing the results of the book-tax model and the accruals 
model, it can be summarized that BTDTEM provides extra information as taxable 
income related information is captured by the measure. 
***lnserts Tables 2.6 and 2.6a here*** 
2.5.3. Book-tax total earnings management and firm value 
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In Table 2.7, I present the result on the relation between earnings 
management and firm value. In this table, I compare the coefficients of BTDTEM 
and accruals to assess how investors react to information on earnings 
management. There is evidence in existing literature that firms can manipulate 
share price as investors fail to respond instantaneously without errors to managed 
earnings. Thus, a priori, there should be no difference in how investors react to 
BTDTEM and accruals because the underlying message conveyed by the two 
measures is that earnings are manipulated. However, it is likely that investors 
react more strongly (overoptimistically) to BTDTEM because of the additional 
information of taxable income related earnings management. Thus, if investors 
react as normally documented in the literature, I expect the coefficients of both 
BTDTEM and Accruals to be positive and that the coefficient on BTDTEM to be 
more significant than that of accruals. The result of the book-tax total earnings 
management model confirms my expectation. In the pooled OLS regression, the 
coefficient on BTDTEM is positive and significant at the 10% level in the pooled 
OLS regression. In the fixed effect model, the coefficient on BTDTEM is positive 
and significant at the 1 % level. The result is consistent with existing literature that 
investors respond incorrectly because they fail to understand immediately the 
meaning of earnings management. The coefficients on Iag1 (BTDTEM) in the 
pooled OLS regression is negative and significant at the 10% level, implying that 
investors correct their mistakes in the following time period as they gradually 
decipher the information content of earnings management. For the fixed effect 
model, a similar result is observed as the coefficients of Iag1 (BTDTEM) and 
lag2(BTDTEM) are negative and significant. Over all, the book-tax total earnings 
management model produces results that are expected and consistent with the 
findings in existing literature. On the other hand, the coefficient on abnormal 
accruals is significant at the 10% percent in the pooled OLS model but 
insignificant in the fixed effect model, confirming that abnormal accruals are less 
useful in explaining firm value. It is surprising to see a negative and significant 
coefficient on accruals quality in Table 2.7a in the pooled OLS and fixed effect 
regressions. The finding is surprising because it suggests investors are able to 
understand immediately the meaning of earnings management and react 
negatively. The inconsistent results based on abnormal accruals and accruals 
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quality reinforce the observation of Dechow et al. (2010) that using accruals as a 
measure of earnings management may lead to conflicting results. In short, the 
result in Tables 2.7 and 2.7a confirm that BTDTEM is a reliable measure of 
earnings management as it provides results that are significant and consistent 
with the literature. 
***lnsert Tables 2.7 and 2.7a here*** 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
In the present study a new measure of earnings management is developed 
from book-tax differences. The new measure is a comprehensive measure that 
encompasses taxable income related earnings management as well as 
conventional book income related accruals management. Using the new measure 
I find that executives time their stock option exercises regardless of the source of 
earnings management; credit rating agencies glean additional information from 
book-tax differences than the conventional earnings management measures that 
focus specifically on accruals; and investors respond to the earnings management 
information contained in the new measure as expected in the literature. This study 
shows that the new measure of earnings management provides empirical 
evidence that opportunistic managers use tax planning activity to advance 
personal interests. Some of my results have not been documented in literature. 
My study contributes to the literature on earnings management by providing a new 
approach to detect earnings management and it is applicable to explain and 
predict many issues in finance. 
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APPENDIX 
Definitions and measurements of variables of interest used in this study 
BTDjt= firm fs total book-tax difference in year t, 
Where: 
- Total book-tax difference = [book income - taxable income] / average total 
assets (Compustat item # 6). 
- Taxable income = [(federal tax expense (Compustat item # 63) + foreign tax 
expense (Compustat item # 64)) - the top U.S. statutory tax rate] - change in 
net operating loss carryforward (Compustat item # 52). 
If federal or foreign tax expense is missing, then 
- Tax expense = total income tax expense (Compustat item # 16) - deferred 
income tax expense (Compustat item # 50). Book income = pre-tax book 
income (Compustat item # 170) - minority interest (Compustat item # 49). 
Dependent Variables 
- BTD_AT is the Total Book-Tax difference normalized by total assets. 
- OPTEXD = stock options that were exercised for common stock during the 
year (millions) 
- Zscore = 3.3*data178/data6+1.2*(Compustat item #4-data5)/data6 + 
data12/data6 + 0.6*data199*data25/(Compustat item #9 + data34) + 
1.4*data36/data6 (compustat) 
- INTCOV = Interest Coverage = EBITDAM/ Interest 
- SPDRC = codes of firm Fs Standard & Poor's senior debt rating in year t, 
varying from 2 to 27. Standard & Poor's rates a firm's debt from AAA 
(indicating a strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal) to D 
(indicating actual default). 
- MTB = Market value-to-Book value = (Compustat item #6-
data60+data199*data25)/data6 
Explanatory variables 
BTDTEMj T = STD [(EBTD)i,t + (EBTD)i,t-1 + (£BTD)i,t-2+ (£BTD)U-3 + (£BTD)i,t -4 ] 
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- Abnormal Accruals^ - STD [(£wc)u+ (£wc)i,t -1 + (£wc)i,t-2+ (ewc)m -3+ (Ewc)i,t -A ] 
Control Variables 
Policy measures 
- CAPEX = Net capital expenditure to assets= (Capital Expenditure - Sale of 
Property, Plant and Equipment)/Assets = (Compustat item #128— 
data107)/data6 
- Book Leverage = (Compustat item #9+data34)/data6 
- Market Leverage = (Compustat item #9+data34)/(Compustat item #6-
data60+data199*data25) 
Firm characteristics 
- ROA = Return on Assets = data13/data6 
- Net PPE = Net Property, Plant, and Equipment to assets = data8/data6 
- Z-Score = 3.3*data178/data6+1.2*(Compustat item #4-
data5)/data6+data12/data6+0.6*data199* 
- data25/(Compustat item #9+data34)+1.4*data36/data6 (compustat) 
- NOLA = Net Operating Loss carry forward to Total Assets = data52 / data6 
- Surplus Cash = Cash from assets-in-place to total assets = (Compustat item 
#308-<Jata125+ data46) / data6 
- Sales Growth = Log(Salest /Salest.i) 
- Dividend Cut = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a 
reduction in annual dividend, and zero otherwise 
- Cash to Assets = data1/data6 
- HighTaxPlanningn = 1 if ETR is in the 3rd quintile and 0 otherwise 
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Definitions Variables 
Total book-tax income differences 
Income Taxes - Total 
Deferred Taxes (Income Account) 
Investment Tax Credit (Income Account) 
Income Taxes Paid 
Standard deviation of estimate errors of total book-tax 
differences 
Insiders' stock option exercises 
Interest coverage 
Book leverage (total debt to total assets) 
Pretax Income 
Change in sale 
Property, Plans & Equipment (Gross) - Total 
Property, Plans & Equipment (Net) - Total 
Postretirement - Funded Status 
Tax Loss Carry Forward 
Pretax Income - Foreign 
Accounting Changes - Cumulative Effect 
Debt - Capitalized Lease Obligations 
Operating cash flow 
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Table 2.1a. 25 US Firms with the Highest Book-Tax income differences per year 
over 2004 - 2010 periods (million dollars) 
This table reports the firms with the highest average of Total Book-Tax Differences over 
my sample period of 2004 to 2010. This sample is ranked by Total book tax spread. 
Firms with non-reporting or missing variables were dropped from this sample. 
Total Average Average 
Company_Name CUSIP MKVALT Assets TBTD BTDTEM 
1 HEWLETT-PACKARD CO 428236103 92651.87 124,503 14,663.265 0.0695 
2 GENERAL MOTORS CO 37045V100 55295.05 138,898 13,919.694 0.1562 
3 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 369604103 194155.23 751,216 12,500.571 0.0210 
4 LIBERTY GLOBAL INC 530555101 8419.00 33,329 10,335.657 0.1223 
5 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC 438516106 41624.28 37,834 10,272.510 0.1198 
6 TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD H89128104 17939.15 27,128 9,506.771 0.1198 
7 PEPSICO INC 713448108 103286.73 68,153 8,865.469 0.0582 
8 INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP 459200101 180220.25 113,452 8,221.918 0.0227 
9 ORACLE CORP 68389X105 173426.96 73,535 8,012.524 0.0508 
10 OWENS CORNING 690742101 3865.72 7,158 7,848.429 1.1327 
11 COCA-COLA CO 191216100 150744.84 72,921 7,083.510 0.0472 
12 AT&T INC 00206R102 173667.74 268,488 6,857.619 0.1020 
13 JDS UNIPHASE CORP 46612J507 2175.89 1,704 6,759.647 1.9900 
14 DOW CHEMICAL 260543103 39848.79 69,588 6,042.122 0.0360 
15 MICROSOFT CORP 594918104 199450.68 86,113 5,847.929 0.0236 
16 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 742718109 170553.13 128,172 5,843.306 0.0544 
17 WAL-MART STORES INC 931142103 197142.12 180,663 5,610.551 0.0199 
18 SPRINT NEXTEL CORP 852061100 12639.24 51,654 4,228.898 0.1035 
19 CIT GROUP INC 125581801 9441.81 50,958 4,063.231 0.0448 
20 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 913017109 72522.30 58,493 4,030.796 0.0544 
21 FLEXTRONICS INTERNATIONAL Y2573F102 5654.74 11,633 3,877.713 0.2015 
22 APPLE INC 37833100 259906.49 75,183 3,805.971 0.0163 
23 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 478160104 169351.30 102,908 3,252.755 0.0471 
24 WASTE MANAGEMENT INC 94106L109 17514.95 21,476 3,235.204 0.0474 



























Table 2.1b. 25 US Firms with the highest standard deviation of abnormal Book-Tax 
income differences per year over 2004-2010 periods (million dollars) 
This table reports the firms with highest average of standard deviation of abnormal Total 
Book-Tax Differences over my sample period of 2004 to 2010. Firms with non-reporting 
or missing variables were dropped from this sample. 
Total 
Company_Name CUSIP MKVALT Assets AvgTBTD Avg BTDTEM 
SINOVAC BIOTECH LTD P8696W104 245.46 214.360 6.196 6.2334 
ADVANCED CELL TECHNOLOGY INC 00752K105 299.48 19.050 -54.370 5.0165 
BROADVISION INC 111412706 56.02 68.150 690.743 4.5947 
ZIX CORP 98974P100 286.85 66.850 120.200 3.6126 
EGAIN COMMUNICATIONS 28225C806 17.26 15.320 80.757 2.9046 
EMAGIN CORP 29076N206 127.26 32.700 -11.106 2.7391 
SUN HEALTHCARE GROUP INC 8.67E+104 316.17 1,081.760 305.619 2.0565 
JDS UNIPHASE CORP 46612J507 2175.89 1,703.600 6,759.647 1.9900 
SHORETEL INC 825211105 210.52 170.720 1.154 1.9311 
QUEPASA CORP 74833W206 178.87 16.450 -8.690 1.8832 
WAVE SYSTEMS CORP 943526301 320.59 17.080 -14.117 1.7265 
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC 00971T101 8779.67 2,352.680 381.900 1.6865 
ANTARES PHARMA INC 36642106 54.56 13.180 -8.943 1.3053 
ANTARES PHARMA INC 36642106 143.07 15.140 -8.943 1.3053 
APPLIED MICRO CIRCUITS CORP 03822W406 660.85 308.660 498.234 1.2707 
OWENS CORNING 690742101 3865.72 7,158.000 7,848.429 1.1327 
MERGE HEALTHCARE INC 589499102 314.25 396.390 100.911 1.1155 
PRIMUS GUARANTY LTD G72457107 193.44 634.860 -141.805 1.0778 
METROPOLITAN HLTH NTWRKS INC 592142103 182.15 74.720 8.258 1.0571 
LIGAND PHARMACEUTICAL INC 53220K504 174.02 75.560 161.735 1.0316 
NAVIDEA BIOPHARMACEUTICALS 63937X103 177.82 10.860 -24.465 1.0242 
CIRRUS LOGIC INC 172755100 1444.00 496.620 328.154 1.0121 
USA MOBILITY INC 90341G103 392.13 230.660 41.324 0.9892 
LIGHTING SCIENCE GROUP CORP 53224G301 408.18 72.490 -172.405 0.9874 
IDENIX PHARMACEUTICALS INC 45166R204 368.38 69.880 20.817 0.9782 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for key variables, 2004-2010 
Panel A: insiders' stock option exercises, standard deviation of abnormal 
book-tax differences and control variables. 
Variable N Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std Dev 
OPTEXD 5,014 309.00 0.00 1.67 0.35 6.58 
BTDTEM 5,014 15.50 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.33 
OPTGR 5,014 244.00 0.00 1.78 0.45 6.99 
OPEPS 5,014 231.69 (246.00) 1.44 1.03 6.50 
ROA 5,014 482.62 (330.44) 2.56 5.08 17.29 
Dividend 5,014 12,408.00 0.00 94.07 0.00 495.22 
CAPX 5,014 40,595.20 0.00 269.87 31.22 1,203.53 
Total Assets 5,014 797,769.00 1.60 5,173.62 891.50 24,564.41 
Price to Book 5,014 1,574.98 0.01 3.81 2.23 19.42 
HighTaxPlanning 5,014 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.43 
Panel B: Firm credit ratings, standard deviation of abnormal book-tax 
differences and control variables. 
Variable N Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std Dev 
SPDRC 4,669 23.00 2.00 12.32 12.00 3.27 
BTDTEM 4,669 15.50 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.37 
LOSS 4,669 1.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.42 
CFO 4,669 48,601.00 -17,332.00 809.61 99.80 2,815.19 
STDROA 4,669 616.95 0.02 8.25 3.61 20.71 
INTCOV 4,669 14,777.70 -1,082,274.00 -281.75 0.52 11,733.24 
DebtToAssets 4,669 4.91 0.00 0.21 0.17 0.23 
Sales 4,669 458,361.00 -0.29 6,709.75 1,030.79 22,332.98 
Cash Surplus 4,669 39,864.00 -33,767.00 466.74 47.91 1,973.83 
PriceToBook 4,669 133.19 0.14 2.06 1.59 2.28 
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Panel C: Market value to book value ratio, standard deviation of abnormal 
book-tax differences and control variables 
Variable N Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std Dev 
MarketToBook 4,112 12.09 0.58 1.90 1.58 1.11 
BTDTEM 4,112 1.36 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.10 
Size 4,112 322,560.00 11.19 7,722.20 1,471.18 21,899.44 
ROA 4,112 0.60 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.06 
Growth in SALE 4,112 826.19 -73.40 10.32 7.41 29.00 
Dividend Cut 4,112 1.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.35 
Debt To Assets 4,112 139.47 0.00 17.39 15.87 15.45 
CAPX 4,112 39,260.60 0.05 462.49 48.39 2,012.33 
Zscore 4,112 95.08 0.03 5.15 3.84 5.37 
Cash Surplus 4,112 0.79 -0.27 0.08 0.08 0.07 
CashToAssets 4,112 0.97 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.16 
HighTaxPlanning 4,112 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.43 
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Table 2.3: Pearson correlations of key variables, 2004 - 2010 
Panel A: insiders' stock option exercises, standard deviation of abnormal 
book-tax differences and control variables - Pearson correlations and p-value 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 5014 










BTDTEM 0.042 1.000 
0.003 
OPTGR 0.659 -0.029 1.000 
<.0001 0.039 
DAT -0.035 -0.122 -0.011 1.000 
0.014 <.0001 0.452 
CAPX 0.226 -0.043 0.214 0.066 1.000 
<.0001 0.002 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA 0.119 0.282 0.060 -0.258 0.013 1.000 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.367 
PTB 0.019 0.019 0.009 0.125 -0.011 0.101 1.000 
0.176 0.173 0.534 <.0001 0.434 <.0001 
SIZE 0.348 -0.165 0.335 0.218 0.462 -0.046 0.009 1.000 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 0.523 
EPS 0.009 0.000 -0.010 0.035 0.098 0.154 0.003 0.172 1.000 
0.502 0.978 0.479 0.014 <.0001 <.0001 0.811 <.0001 
DSALE 0.040 -0.026 0.041 0.009 0.020 0.050 -0.007 0.071 0.019 1.000 
0.004 0.070 0.004 0.547 0.163 0.000 0.616 <.0001 0.190 
HTAX_ 0.000 -0.054 -0.010 0.096 0.043 -0.082 -0.020 0.033 -0.012 -0.002 1.000 
PLANNING 0.974 0.000 0.496 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 0.159 0.019 0.384 0.888 
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Panel B: Firm credit ratings, standard deviation of abnormal book-tax 
differences and control variables - Pearson correlations and p-value 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Prob > |r| under HO: Rho=0 
BTD_ 
SPDRC TEM LOSS CFO STDROA INTCOV DAT SALES SCASH MTB 
SPDRC 1.0000 
BTD­ 0.1729 1.0000 
TEM <.0001 
LOSS 0.3816 0.1502 1.0000 
<.0001 <.0001 
CFO -0.4821 -0.0540 -0.1228 1.0000 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
STD- 0.2544 0.5540 0.2451 -0.0705 1.0000 
ROA <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
INTCOV -0.0089 -0.0175 -0.0500 0.0075 -0.0421 1.0000 
0.5494 0.0857 <.0001 0.4581 <.0001 
DAT 0.4188 0.0414 0.1301 0.0151 0.0846 0.0169 1.0000 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1097 <.0001 0.0965 
SALES -0.3980 -0.0537 -0.0898 0.8053 -0.0714 0.0077 0.0306 1.0000 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.4504 0.0012 
SCASH -0.4517 -0.0459 -0.1390 0.9319 -0.0602 0.0064 -0.0060 0.6503 1.0000 
<.0001 <.0001 <0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.5345 0.5303 <.0001 
MTB -0.3269 0.2051 0.0403 -0.0241 0.3453 -0.1203 0.0592 -0.0534 -0.0004 1.0000 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0108 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9636 
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Panel C: Firm credit ratings, standard deviation of abnormal book-tax 
differences and control variables - Pearson correlations and p-value 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 4112 
Prob > |r| under HO: Rho=0 




Cut DAT CAPX 
Z_ 
SCORE SCASH CASH 
MTB 1.000 
BTDTEM 0.046 1.000 
0.003 
SIZE -0.069 -0.071 1.000 
<.0001 <.0001 
ROA 0.582 0.107 -0.025 1.000 
<.0001 <.0001 0.109 
DSALE 0.149 0.099 -0.017 0.198 1.000 
<.0001 <.0001 0.286 <.0001 
Dividend -0.087 -0.058 0.073 -0.078 -0.110 1.000 
Cut <.0001 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
DAT -0.200 -0.069 0.091 -0.234 -0.052 0.076 1.000 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 
CAPX -0.057 -0.057 0.833 -0.005 0.007 0.059 0.051 1.000 
0.000 0.000 <.0001 0.768 0.656 0.000 0.001 
ZSCORE 0.588 -0.012 -0.110 0.427 0.074 -0.066 -0.395 -0.072 1.000 
<.0001 0.446 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
SCASH 0.513 0.025 -0.036 0.651 0.052 -0.040 -0.214 -0.012 0.358 1.000 
<.0001 0.110 0.021 <.0001 0.001 0.011 <.0001 0.457 <.0001 
CASH 0.306 0.197 -0.136 0.285 0.073 -0.082 -0.430 -0.126 0.323 0.312 1.000 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
HighTax -0.069 0.247 -0.042 -0.039 0.074 0.015 0.061 -0.029 -0.093 -0.062 0.094 
Planning <.0001 <.0001 0.007 0.012 <.0001 0.333 <.0001 0.061 <.0001 <.0001 <.ooo-
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Table 2.4. Two models of firm level time series OLS Regression of Total Book-Tax 
income differences and accruals and their key factors 
This table includes two models with fix one time panel regressions using total book-tax 
income differences or accruals as the dependent variable. In model 1 BTD_AT is Total 
Book-Tax difference normalized by total assets. DSALE_AT is the change in sale scaled by 
total assets. DPRBA_AT is the change on scaled the post retirement-fund status. 
DTLCF_AT is a change in tax loss carry forward scaled by total assets. PPENTPPEGT is 
ratio of PP&E (Net) to PP&E (Gross). PPEGT_AT represents the gross cost of tangible 
fixed property used in the production of revenue scaled by total assets PIFO is foreign 
pretax income scaled by total assets. DCLO_AT is the capitalized lease obligations 
normalized by total assets. NonGDWLINTAN_AT is the non good will intangible assets 
scaled by total assets. In model 2 CFO is cash flow from operations from the SFAS No. 95, 
Statement of Cash Flows; dSa/et, are the change in sales in year t and PPEi t are the level 
of property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t. All variables are normalized by total 
assets. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars 
are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by 
the period 1999 through 2010. The sample included 34,089 firm year observations. 
Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable: BTD_AT Dependent Variable: CA_AT 
VarName PARAM VarName PARAM 
Intercept 0.007 Intercept -0.002 
0.49 -0.81 
DSALE_AT -0.056"* CFO_AT 0.357"* 
-15.46 260.71 
DPRBA_AT 1.782"* LAGCFO_AT -0.077*** 
5.97 -53.84 
DGDWL_AT 0.409*** LEADCFO_AT -0.077*** 
7.59 -38.52 
PPENT_PPEGT 0.002 DSALE_AT 0.018"* 
1.38 8.44 















*, **, *" Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
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Table 2.5. Regressions of Insiders' stock option exercises on earnings 
management measured by standard deviation of estimate errors of book-tax 
income differences, accruals and Abnormal accruals measured by absolute 
value of the residual 
Insiders' stock option exercises - Optexd is the dependent variable. The key independent 
variables are standard deviation of abnormal book-tax income differences denoted as 
BTDTEM and ACCRUALS which is proxied by an alternative measure of accrual quality 
at the firm-year level measured by absolute value of the residual or abnormal accruals for 
that year. HightaxPlanning is a (01) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the firm's 
effective tax rate is lower than the 1rt quintile, and 0 otherwise. LowSTDRES is a (01) 
dummy variable taking a value 1 if the StdRes is lower than the median, and 0 otherwise. 
LogOPTGR is natural logarithm of option grant. DAT is total debt to total assets. 
LogCAPX is natural logarithm of capital expenditure. ROA is return on assets. PTB is 
price to book ratio. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. OPEPS is basic EPS from 
operations. LogDSALE is growth in sale and is calculated as natural logarithm of ratio of 
salet to salet.i. SIC2 is two digit industry codes, Compustat. R-squared, adjusted R-
squared, estimated coefficients and associated t-value and number of observations for 
each model and specification are also reported. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with 
market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except regulated (SICs 4900-
4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1999 through 2010. 
Dependent variables: Insiders' stock option exercises - Optexd 
Book-Tax earnings management model Abnormal Accruals model 
Pooled 
Pooled OLS FixTwo OLS FixTwo 
Expected 
Variable sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 
Intercept +  or - -0.243*** -0.264*** -0.796*** -0.802*** Intercept 2.605*** 10.878*** 
-4.61 -5.52 -3.41 -3.45 (7.07) (8.96) 


















OPTGR (Options + 
Granted) 0.338*** 0.338*** 0.050*** 0.050*** OPTGR 0.306*** 0.175*** 
24.54 24.99 4.05 4.00 (8.13) (2.64) 
OPEPS + o r- -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 EPS -0.397*** 0.026 
-1.92 -1.94 -0.98 -0.91 (-6.58) (021)  
ROA + 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** ROA 0.168*** 0.053 
7.97 8.62 5.63 5.94 (3.84) (1.16) 
Dividend - -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 Dividend -0.008 0.031 
-0.07 -0.27 -0.75 -0.72 (-0.67) (0.81) 
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Table 2.5. (continued) 
Expected 
Variable sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 
CAPX - 0.008 0.007 -0.023** -0.022** LogCAPX 0.010 0.001 
1.15 1.04 -2.24 -2.16 (0.29) (0.02) 
Size +  or - 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.170*** 0.176*** Size -0.279*** -1.375*** 
12.02 12.17 9.38 9.73 (-5.29) (-11-13) 
PTB + 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.158*** 0.156*** PTB 0.348*** 0.374*** 
16.80 16.86 15.31 15.14 (6.87) (5.75) 
LagOptexd + 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.010** 0.010** LagOptexd 0.266*** -0.041*** 
X rtp _ 





Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-squared 0.6666 0.6670 0.0.8291 0.8292 0.2419 0.7026 
Obs. 5,014 5,014 836x6 836x6 4,499 749x6 
, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
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Table 2.5a. Regressions of Insiders' stock option exercises on earnings 
management measured by standard deviation of estimate errors of book-tax 
income differences, accruals and control variables 
Insiders' stock option exercises - Optexd is the dependent variable. The key independent 
variables are standard deviation of abnormal book-tax income differences denoted as 
BTDTEM and Abnormal ACCRUALS hich is proxied by accrual quality at the firm-year 
level measured by the standard deviation of the residuals for that year. HightaxPlanning 
is a (01) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the firm's effective tax rate is lower than 
the 1rt quintile, and 0 otherwise. LowSTDRES is a (01) dummy variable taking a value 1 if 
the StdRes is lower than the median, and 0 otherwise. LogOPTGR is natural logarithm of 
option grant. LogCAPX is natural logarithm of capital expenditure. ROA is return on 
assets. PTB is price to book ratio. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. OPEPS is 
basic EPS from operations. SIC2 is two digit industry codes, Compustat. R-squared, 
adjusted R-squared, estimated coefficients and associated t-value and number of 
observations for each model and specification are also reported. All COMPUSTAT 
reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except 
regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1999 
through 2010. 
Dependent variables: Insiders' stock option exercises - Optexd 
Book-Tax earnings management model Accruals Quality model 
Pooled OLS FixTwo Pooled OLS FixTwo 
Expected 
Variable sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 
Intercept +  or - -0.243*" -0.264*** -0.796*** -0.802"* -0.666*** -1.101*" 
-4.61 -5.52 -3.41 -3.45 -8.33 -3.51 
















OPTGR (Options Granted) + 0.338"* 0.338*** 0.050"* 0.050*" 0.296"* 0.017 
24.54 24.99 4.05 4.00 16.00 1.07 
OPEPS + o r- -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 -0.175*** 0.044 
-1.92 -1.94 -0.98 -0.91 -8.46 1.53 
ROA + 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*" 0.107*** 0.040*** 
7.97 8.62 5.63 5.94 9.53 3.56 
Dividend - -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.011*** -0.015 
-0.07 -0.27 -0.75 -0.72 -2.58 -1.64 
CAPX - 0.008 0.007 -0.023" -0.022" -0.030"* -0.034"* 
1.15 1.04 -2.24 -2.16 -6.97 -5.26 
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Table 2.5a. (continued) 
Expected 
Variable sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 
Size +  or - 0.092"* 0.092*** 0.170"* 0.176"* -0.011 -0.048*** 
12.02 12.17 9.38 9.73 -1.24 -3.20 
PTB + 0.134"* 0.133*" 0.158*** 0.156"* 0.185*** 0.224*** 
16.80 16.86 15.31 15.14 15.22 7.61 
LagSTDRES + 0.132*** 0.132*" 0.010" 0.010" 0.106*** 0.158"* 
28.98 29.10 2.45 2.43 9.19 9.70 




Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-squared 0.6666 0.6670 0.0.8291 0.8292 0.7149 0.8659 
Obs. 5,014 5,014 836x6 836x6 4,499 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
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Table 2.6. Ordered Logit regression of firm's credit rating on earnings 
management measured by standard deviation of estimate errors of total 
book-tax differences and Abnormal accruals measured by absolute value 
of the residual 
This table shows ordered logit regressions using Firm's Credit ratings - SPDRC as 
dependent variable and standard deviation of total book-tax income differences -
BTDTEM along with Abnormal ACCRUALS as the key independent variables. 
Abnormal ACCRUALS is proxied by an alternative measure of accrual quality at the 
firm-year level measured by absolute value of the residual or abnormal accruals for that 
year. Loss is dummy variable taking value of 1 if OPEPS is negative and 0 otherwise. 
dCFO is the change in operating cash flow. STDROA is the firm i's standard deviation of 
ROA from year t-1 to year t which is calculated using five years data from year t-4 to t. 
INTCOV is the interest coverage ratio which is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation divided by interest expense at the end of year t. BLEV is book leverage 
calculated as total debt divided by book value of total assets. DSALE is grown in sale 
which is a natural logarithm of sale in year t divided by sale in year t-1. SCASH_AT is 
cash surplus calculated as cash from assets-in-place to total assets. MTB is market to 
book ratio. HTAXPLANNING is high tax planning dummy variable taking value of 1 if the 
firm has an average of effective tax rate from year t-4 to year t below 1st quintile and 0 
otherwise. SIC2 is dummy variable at two digits SIC code from Compustat, taking value 
of 1 if firm I is a member of industry j; zero otherwise. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms 
with market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except regulated (SICs 
4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1999 through 2010. The 
sample included 4,669 observations. 
Dependent variables: Firm's Credit ratings - SPDRC 
Book-tax earnings management model Abnormal Accrual model 
Variable 
Expected 
sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 
Intercept +  or - -5.074*" -4.699*" Intercept 7.0027*" 
42.08 37.141 748.85 
BTDTEM - -0.172*" ACCRUALS -1.4493*" 
t-value 11.33 Chi-Square 3.82 
HighTaxPlanning*BTDTEM + 0.095*** 
t-value 7.982 
LowTaxPlanning*BTDTEM + or - 0.024 
t-value 1.102 
Loss - -0.264" -0.258" Loss -0.6722*** 
t-value 5.191 4.903 Chi-Square 6.76 
dCFO + 0.694*** 0.688*** dCFO 0.0020*** 
t-value 50.10 49.35 Chi-Square 7.59 
STDROA - -0.426*** -0.482"* STDROA -0.0268*** 
t-value 108.63 163.37 Chi-Square 76.79 
INTCOV + 0.710*** 0.732*** INTCOV -0.0185"* 
t-value 190.00 202.67 Chi-Square 76.96 
BLEV - 0.035 0.047 BLEV -0.0212*** 
t-value 0.489 0.859 Chi-Square 303.78 
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Table 2.6. (continued) 
Expected 
Variable sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 
DSALE + 1.238"* 1.282*" DSALE -0.0781 
t-value 200.45 216.89 Chi-Square 20.63 
SCASH_AT + 0.147" 0.142" SCASH_AT 4.5224"* 
t-value 6.175 5.760 Chi-Square 225.36 
MTB + 0.668"* 0.654*" 
t-value 211.34 204.32 
HighTAXPLANNING - -0.225" 
t-value 5.669 
Industry dummy YES YES YES 
YearDummy YES YES YES 
Obs 4,669 4,669 4,669 
* ** •»* significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
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Table 2.6a. Ordered Logit regression of firm's credit rating on earnings 
management measured by standard deviation of estimate errors of total book-
tax differences and control variables 
This table shows ordered logit regressions using Firm's Credit ratings - SPDRC as 
dependent variable and standard deviation of total book-tax income differences as the 
key independent variable. ACCRUALS is measured by the standard deviation of the 
residuals as a firm-specific measure of accrual quality. Loss is dummy variable taking 
value of 1 if OPEPS is negative and 0 otherwise. dCFO is the change in operating cash 
flow. STDROA is the firm i's standard deviation of ROA from year t-1 to year t which is 
calculated using five years data from year t-4 to t. INTCOV is the interest coverage ratio 
which is calculated as operating income before depreciation divided by interest expense 
at the end of year t. BLEV is book leverage calculated as total debt divided by book 
value of total assets. DSALE is grown in sale which is a natural logarithm of sale in year 
t divided by sale in year t-1. SCASH_AT is cash surplus calculated as cash from assets-
in-place to total assets. MTB is market to book ratio. HTAXPLANNING is high tax 
planning dummy variable taking value of 1 if the firm has an average of effective tax rate 
from year t-4 to year t below 1st quintile and 0 otherwise. SIC2 is dummy variable at two 
digits SIC code from Compustat, taking value of 1 if firm I is a member of industry j; zero 
otherwise. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million 
dollars are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000-
6999) by the period 1999 through 2010. The sample included 4,112 observations. 
Dependent variables: Firm's Credit ratings - SPDRC 
Book-tax earnings management model Accruals Quality model 
Variable 
Expected 
sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 
Intercept +  or - -5.074"* -4.699*** Intercept 6.4936"* 
42.08 37.141 869.56 
BTDTEM - -0.172"* ACCRUALS -15.1153*" 
11.33 193.61 
HighTaxPlanning*BTDTEM + 0.095*" 
7.982 
LowTaxPlanning*BTDTEM + or - 0.024 
1.102 
Loss - -0.264" -0.258" Loss -0.6635*" 
5.191 4.903 7.28 
dCFO + 0.694"* 0.688*** dCFO 0.0029*** 
50.10 49.35 7.77 
STDROA - -0.426*** -0.482*** STDROA -0.0174*** 
108.63 163.37 37.87 
INTCOV + 0.710*" 0.732*** INTCOV 0.0139*" 
190.00 202.67 38.90 
BLEV - 0.035 0.047 BLEV -0.0217*** 
0.489 0.859 396.59 
DSALE + 1.238*** 1.282*** DSALE -0.0576 
200.45 216.89 2.02 
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Table 2.6a (continued) 
Expected 
Variable sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 
SCASH AT + 0.147** 0.142** SCASH AT 3.5139*** 
6.175 5.760 142.30 
MTB + 0.668*** 0.654*** 
211.34 204.32 
HighTAXPLANNING - -0.225** 
5.669 
Industry dummy YES YES YES 
YearDummy YES YES YES 
', **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
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Table 2.7. OLS regressions of firm value on earnings management. Accruals 
measured by absolute value of the residual or abnormal accruals 
This table shows OLS regressions model using Market value To Book value as 
dependent variable and BTDTEM - standard deviation of abnormal book-tax income 
differences - in year t, t-1, t-12 and t-3 and Accruals measured by absolute value of the 
residual or abnormal accruals as the key independent variables. Size is natural logarithm 
of total assets. ROA is return on assets. DSALE is grow in sale and is calculated as 
natural logarithm of ratio of salet to sale^. Dividend cut is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of 1 if there is a reduction in annual dividend, and 0 otherwise. Book leverage is 
total debt to book value of total assets. Market leverage is total debt to market value of 
total assets. CAPEX is net capital expenditure to assets. Z-score is a bankruptcy index 
developed by Edward Altman in which higher value of Z-score, lower probability of 
bankruptcy. NOLA is net operating loss carry forward to assets. SCASH is cash surplus 
calculated as cash from assets-in-place to total assets. HTAXPLANNING is a high tax 
planning dummy variable which takes value of 1 if the firm has an average of effective tax 
rate from year t-3 to year t below 1st quintile and 0 otherwise. All COMPUSTAT reporting 
firms with market value greater the 100 million dollars are included except regulated 
(SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000- 6999) by the period 1999 through 
2010. The sample included 4,112 observations. 
Dependent variables: Market value To Book value - MTB 
Book-tax earnings management 





OLS FixTwo Variable 
Pooled 
OLS FixTwo 
Intercept +  or - -0.290*" -0.453"* Intercept -1.004"* -1.105*** 
-4.204 -2.73 (-9.11) (-4.21) 
BTDTEM + 0.019* 0.031"* Accruals 0.010* 0.004 
1.664 3.25 (1.78) (0.80) 
Lagl(BTDTEM) - -0.024* -0.013* Lag1 (Accruals) -0.002 -0.010" 
-1.656 -1.66 (-0.39) (-2.04) 
Lag2(BTDTEM) +  or - -0.004 -0.020" Lag2(Accruals) -0.006 -0.011" 
-0.304 2.48 (-0.98) (-2.25) 
Size + 0.025*" -0.118*" Size 0.019*" -0.143*** 
7.071 -5.81 (3.15) (-4.59) 
ROA + 0.032*** -0.006 ROA 0.157"* 0.050*** 
3.968 -1.23 (10.40) (5.67) 
Grows in SALE + 0.196"* 0.130"* Grow in SALE 0.314"* 0.032 
6.530 7.48 (6.67) (0.91) 
Dividend cut - -0.031" -0.001 Dividend Cut -0.037* -0.021 
-2.451 -0.05 (-1.72) (-1.11) 
Book Leverage + 0.022"* 0.105*** Book Leverage 0.002"* 0.003*" 
17.522 14.05 (2.62) (3.22) 
CAPEX + 0.025*** 0.012 CAPEX 0.046*** -0.026" 
4.685 1.43 (4.45) (-2.04) 
Zscore + 0.352*** 0.499*" LogZscore 0.609*" 0.779*** 
16.477 33.91 (16.17) (31.10) 
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OLS FixTwo Variable 
Pooled 
OLS FixTwo 
NOLA +  or - 0.192*** -0.015 NOLA 0.429*** 0.368"* 
3.660 -0.28 (5.90) (4.43) 
Cash Surplus + 1.184*** 0.060 CASH Surplus 1.355*" 0.254" 
10.043 0.86 (7.56) (2.28) 
Cash to total + Cash to total 
Assets 0.012*** 0.001 assets 0.035*** -0.002 
3.245 0.11 (4.86) (-0.19) 
HTAXPLANNING + 0.039*** 0.026" 
3.114 2.30 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 








* ** *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
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Table 2.7a. OLS regressions of firm value on earnings management. Accruals 
is measured by the standard deviation of the residuals 
This table shows OLS regressions model using Market value To Book value as 
dependent variable and BTDTEM - standard deviation of abnormal book-tax income 
differences - in year t, t-1, t-12 and t-3 as the key independent variables. ACCRUALS is 
measured by the standard deviation of the residuals as a firm-specific measure of accrual 
quality. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on assets. DSALE is grow in 
sale and is calculated as natural logarithm of ratio of salet to salet.i. Dividend cut is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a reduction in annual dividend, and 0 
otherwise. Book leverage is total debt to book value of total assets. Market leverage is total 
debt to market value of total assets. CAPEX is net capital expenditure to assets. Z-score is 
a bankruptcy index developed by Edward Altman in which higher value of Z-core, lower 
probability of bankruptcy. NOLA is net operating loss carry forward to assets. SCASH is 
cash surplus calculated as cash from assets-in-place to total assets. CASH is Cash to 
Assets. HTAXPLANNING is a high tax planning dummy variable which takes value of 1 if 
the firm has an average of effective tax rate from year t-3 to year t below 1st quintile and 0 
otherwise. All COMPUSTAT reporting firms with market value greater the 100 million 
dollars are included except regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms (SICs 6000-
6999) by the period 1999 through 2010. The sample included 4,112 observations. 
Dependent variables: Market value To Book value - MTB 
Book-tax earnings management . , . ... . . 





OLS FixTwo Variable 
Pooled 
OLS FixTwo 
Intercept +  or - -0.290"* -0.453*" Intercept -0.567*" -0.101 
-4.204 -2.73 -8.028 -0.39 
BTDTEM + 0.019* 0.031*" Accruals -0.045*** -0.023* 
1.664 3.25 -2.691 -1.67 
Lag1 (BTDTEM) - -0.024* -0.013* Lag 1 (Accruals) -0.029 -0.002 
-1.656 -1.66 -1.220 -0.13 
Lag2(BTDTEM) +  or - -0.004 -0.020" Lag2(Accruals) 0.006 -0.011 
-0.304 2.48 0.275 -0.94 
Lag3(BTDTEM) +  or - 0.012 -0.002 Lag3(Accruals) 0.006 0.006 
1.245 -0.21 0.407 0.49 
Size + 0.025*" -0.118*** Size 0.025*** -0.024 
7.071 -5.81 5.004 -0.76 
ROA + 0.032*** -0.006 ROA 0.036*** -0.011 
3.968 -1.23 3.253 -1.53 
Grows in SALE + 0.196*** 0.130"* Grow in SALE 0.241"* 0.042* 
6.530 7.48 6.049 1.69 
Dividend cut - -0.031" -0.001 Dividend Cut -0.027 0.016 
-2.451 -0.05 -1.613 1.19 
Book Leverage + 0.022*** 0.105*" Book Leverage 0.015"* 0.112*** 
17.522 14.05 5.702 11.33 
Market Leverage - -2.665*** -1.177*** Market Leverage -1.828*" -0.770"* 
-17.628 -10.62 -6.735 -5.49 
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Table 2.7a. (continued) 
Expected Pooled Pooled 
Variable signs OLS FixTwo Variable OLS FixTwo 
CAPEX + 0.025"* 0.012 CAPEX 0.029*** -0.025" 
4.685 1.43 3.496 -2.29 
Zscore + 0.352"* 0.499*** Zscore 0.368*" 0.656*** 
16.477 33.91 19.161 28.76 
NOLA +  or - 0.192*** -0.015 NOLA 0.263*** 0.215"* 
3.660 -0.28 3.490 2.72 
Cash Surplus + 1.184*" 0.060 CASH Surplus 1.171*** 0.238*** 
10.043 0.86 7.531 2.72 
+ Cash to total 
Cash to total Assets 0.012*" 0.001 assets 0.009* -0.004 
3.245 0.11 1.806 -0.62 




Industry dummies Yes YES Yes 
Year dummies Yes NO Yes 
R Squared 0.6830 0.9232 0.6839 0.9476 
Adj. R-Squared 0.6813 0.6811 
* .. significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
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